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THE UNINTELLIGIBILITY OF SCEPTICISM RESURRECTED
ABSTRACT
Scepticism about the external world is the view that all our everyday and scientific 
beliefs are epistemically on a par. Scepticism does not deny that we have true beliefs, 
only that we have any rational justification for accepting them as true.
In this thesis I examine the claim that what passes for the doctrine of scepticism is in 
fact incoherent. My thesis consists of four sections. In the introduction I briefly 
discuss and reject the naturalist’s response to scepticism. In the second section, I 
introduce the sceptical argument and defend it as a philosophical extension of our 
ordinary epistemic practices. In the third section, I examine G E Moore’s famous anti- 
sceptical papers, which I eventually reject. The final part of my thesis looks at 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (OC), in which he wrestles with the idea of the 
intelligibility of scepticism. The claim that scepticism, or indeed any philosophical 
position, is unintelligible is not easy to establish and I do not think Wittgenstein 
demonstrates that it is so. Nevertheless, I do think he pushes scepticism to a point 
where it is difficult to see how it could occupy any conceptual space in our intellectual 
lives.
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INTRODUCTION
Philosophical scepticism is the view that there can be no good grounds for believing 
that we know anything about the external physical world. The phrase ‘Knowledge of 
the external world’ covers “not only all the natural sciences and all of history, it covers 
all everyday, unsystematic factual claims belonging to no particular investigative 
discipline”.1 It therefore threatens all our beliefs about the world and, in consequence, 
the concept of reality that goes with it. Importantly, the truth of scepticism is 
compatible with all our beliefs being true, but deprives us of any rational reason for 
accepting them as so.
Philosophical scepticism is not, of course, the only type of scepticism, but it is the most 
universal and hence the most radical. Bas van Fraassen2 for example, is sceptical about 
the unobservable entities postulated by scientific theories. He thinks that science gives 
us insufficient reason to believe in unobservable objects like ‘spin’, ‘electron’, or 
‘quark’, remaining agnostic about their reality. He does not, however, express any 
doubt in beliefs about the observable world. Rather unobservable objects are 
introduced to explain the phenomena of the observable world. Indeed, it would be 
absurd to maintain that we lacked justification for believing in observable objects but 
had good reason for believing in unobservable ones.
1 Williams 1996, p. 103
2 van Fraassen 1980
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The sceptical claim is a conclusion and not a self-evident premise. This means it is the 
result of argument and, therefore, its appeal cannot lie in the sceptical claim itself, but 
rather in the steps leading up to it. This no doubt explains the often-cited analogy 
between the sceptical argument and Zeno’s paradoxes of motion.3 The sceptic presents 
us with acceptable arguments that entail a completely unacceptable conclusion. The 
question is, what is the right diagnosis of the argument?
In this thesis I look at Moore and Wittgenstein’s arguments for the unintelligibility of 
scepticism. Of course, they are not the only anti-sceptical arguments, but 
Wittgenstein’s, in particular, is one that I find most compelling and attractive. But let 
me first say something about two alternative anti-sceptical replies.
One very influential anti-sceptical response is thought to be provided by a ‘naturalised 
epistemology’, a program initiated by Quine. Quine’s own answer to scepticism is 
ambiguous, but his writings influenced a new way of approaching epistemology and, in 
turn, how we might refute the traditional sceptical problem. Quine (1977) expresses 
this new approach like this:
Epistemology is best looked upon, then, as an enterprise within natural science. Cartesian 
doubt is not the way to begin. Retaining our present beliefs about nature, we can still ask how 
we can have arrived at them. Science tells us that our only source of information about the 
external world is through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces. 
Stimulated in these ways, we somehow evolve an elaborate and useful science. How do we do 
this, and why does the resulting science work so well? These are genuine questions, and no 
feigning a doubt is needed to appreciate them. They are scientific questions about a species of
3 Stroud 1984 p. 139; Williams op.c/Ypp.xviii.
primates, and they are open to investigation in natural science, the very science whose 
acquisition is being investigated (Quine NNK, p68).
The problems of epistemology are scientific and subject to the same standards 
governing theory appraisal in the sciences, such as simplicity, explanatory depth, 
avoiding ad hoc explanations or the ability to make novel and successful predictions. 
This view of epistemology leads Quine to treat even the existence of physical bodies as 
a hypothesis ‘conceptually imported’ and ‘comparable to the gods of Homer’4. The 
difference between belief in physical bodies and Homer’s gods is that the former best 
explains the sensory evidence and provides a better ‘device for working a manageable 
structure into the flux of experience’. According to this new conception of 
epistemology, then, scepticism is to be treated as a theory, and tested according to our 
current methodological prescriptions and against our best scientific candidates.
A recent attempt at discrediting scepticism this way is Jonathan Vogel’s paper 
‘Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation’5. Vogel does not actually 
pit scepticism against any sophisticated scientific theory but against a ‘scientifically 
unsophisticated common-sense view of the world’ (p. 3 53), by which he means that the 
visual and tactile impressions we receive are caused by certain objects having certain 
properties and standing in genuine causal relations with each other. Scepticism, he 
says, “questions our ability to read off the “real” or intrinsic character of things from 
those things’ causal behavior” (p.355). Vogel’s strategy is to show how our
4 Quine 1987
5 Vogel 1998
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unsophisticated common-sense view of the world better explains the content of our 
experiences than does the sceptical hypothesis.
There is no need to go into the details of Vogel’s argument since my objection to it is a 
general one. Both Quine and Vogel fail to see a difference in status between scientific 
theories and certain everyday propositions. That there is a distinction is something to 
which G E Moore was particularly sensitive:
Suppose, that now, instead of saying, “I am inside a building”, I were to say “ I think I’m 
inside a building”, but perhaps I’m not: it’s not certain that I am, or instead of saying “ I 
have got some clothes on”, I were to say “ I think I’ve got some clothes on, but it’s just 
possible that I haven’t”. (Moore 1957 pp227-228)
Moore is surely correct. It would be absurd to doubt the above remarks, while no such 
absurdity results from saying ‘I think electrons exist, but I’m not certain, it is possible 
that they don’t’. We saw, for example, how van Fraassen is agnostic about 
unobservables, which is just to say that he is not certain that they do exist. The 
difference in status between the two kinds of beliefs is due to the absence of evidence 
for Moore’s statements. Scientific hypothesis is revisable, which need not be 
considered a fault but a virtue since it allows one theory to be replaced by a better 
theory resulting in scientific progress. It is not clear however just what kind of 
evidence could falsify Moore’s remarks. In fact, it is not even clear what the 
supporting evidence could be either. We might think perceiving that Moore has clothes 
on fulfills this evidential role, but if a person does not know whether he or someone 
standing in front of him is wearing clothes or not, then we are more likely to conclude
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there is a problem with his vision, rather than accept his doubt. Similarly with refuting 
evidence, anything that appeared to contradict Moore’s claim to be certain that he has 
clothes on would most likely be rejected and explained away.
We must be careful here. Whatever the nature of this certainty, certainty is not the 
same as knowledge. One can be as certain as one likes and still be wrong, while if one 
knows, it follows conceptually that he cannot be wrong. If one does know, this may be 
accompanied by a feeling of certainty, but the certainty itself is just this, an 
accompaniment which does not justify or transform a belief into knowledge. 
Sometimes the two are used synonymously, but, when they are, it is usually used to 
convey an assurance that the speaker does know.
My objection against Quine and Vogel’s approach, then, is that they conflate scientific 
and everyday beliefs by regarding them as being on the same ‘epistemological footing’. 
This seems counter-intuitive and goes against the way we think and use particular 
propositions. Even if Vogel’s argument is satisfactory, it builds into the common sense 
view of the world the possibility that it may one day be refuted. While this may be true 
for some common sense beliefs, it cannot be true of all. Rather than be swayed by the 
naturalist’s dogma that all beliefs are hypotheses open to revision, we would do better 
to examine the cases where this prejudice breaks down.
Of course, the authenticity of the certainty Moore alludes to needs further elucidation 
if the distinction between the two types of belief is to be maintained. If such a certainty 
exists and if it makes no sense to doubt particular everyday beliefs, then scepticism will 
have been silenced.
A second type of anti-sceptical argument is associated with Thomas Nagel (1986) and 
Barry Stroud (1984). According to these philosophers, scepticism is “built into our 
ordinary thought”, by means of the concept of objectivity. Scepticism is the natural 
outcome of reasoning objectively about the world. Stroud explains objectivity like this:
I am trying to express a conception of the independence of the world, of the idea that the 
world is there quite independently of human knowledge and belief, that I think we all 
understand... There seems to be nothing in the conception itself to imply that knowledge or 
reasonable belief about the objective world is impossible...What we aspire to and eventually 
claim to know is something that holds quite independently of our knowing it or of our being 
in a position reasonably to assert it. That is the very idea of objectivity.
(Stroud, 1984. p78)
This idea of objectivity seems to be comprehensible, harmless and entirely natural. 
How then does it lead to scepticism? Here is Nagel's explanation:
Objectivity and skepticism are closely related: both develop from the idea that there is a real 
world in which we are contained, and that appearances result from our interaction with the 
rest of it. We cannot accept those appearances uncritically, but must try to understand what 
our own constitution contributes to them. To do this we try to develop an idea of the world 
with ourselves in it... But this idea, since it is we who develop it, is likewise the product of 
interaction between us and the world...However often we may try to step outside of ourselves, 
something will have to stay behind the lens...and this will give grounds for doubt that we are 
really getting any closer to reality...The idea of objectivity thus seems to undermine 
itself....The search for objective knowledge, because of its commitment to a realistic picture,
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is inescapably subject to skepticism and cannot refute it but must proceed under its shadow.
Skepticism, in turn, is a problem only because of the realist claims of objectivity.
(Nagel, 1986 pp.67-70)
The concept of objectivity or objective truth is here understood as non-epistemic, 
meaning that our propositions refer to a reality which is independent of any means we 
have for accessing it. The problem Stroud and Nagel find in this concept is that it 
creates a logical gap between the world and our knowledge of it, so that no matter 
how much or how good our evidence for the truth of a statement or theory, there 
always remains the logical possibility of doubt. It is not surprising then that the concept 
of objectivity gives rise to the problem of scepticism.
Both philosophers wish to save us from scepticism without actually refuting it. That is, 
they believe that we can live with the sceptic. However, what I find perplexing is 
Nagel’s view that science increasingly advances to a more objective conception of the 
world, while maintaining that scepticism is an outgrowth of objectivity. Nagel remarks 
that without scientific advances we could make no sense of the idea of intellectual 
progress. I think Nagel is confused here. Scepticism does not deny the existence of the 
world, so it is compatible with all our beliefs being true. However it cannot be 
compatible with the claim that we know some of our beliefs to be true, or even 
approximately true. We may think that science is approximately true, but if it proceeds 
under the shadow of scepticism, then for all we know it may be false. This suggests 
that Nagel confuses scepticism with fallibilism, the view that we can progressively 
eliminate error from science by critical testing. I am not suggesting that scepticism and 
fallibilism are incompatible. One could accept Quine’s fallibilist picture of science as a
8
device for co-ordinating appearances and leave it open if these theories represent the 
reality behind the appearances. But this is not what Nagel is saying. If science increases 
our objective knowledge, then the ‘gap’ between the world and our knowledge of it 
has been bridged.
I do think there is something unintelligible in the concept of objectivity endorsed by 
Nagel and Stroud. It is a central burden carried by this thesis to establish the 
unintelligibility of what Nagel calls ‘the view from nowhere’, or what Wittgenstein 
would call a philosophical employment of our words.
What I hope to show in this thesis is that there is a good case for the unintelligibility of 
scepticism. I am of course resurrecting the old Wittgensteinian position that is no 
longer held in the favour it used to be. But I think I am justified for two reasons. 
Firstly, the Wittgensteinian text in question is his final monograph On Certainty (OC), 
a collection of first-draft material, the final entries of which were written only days 
before his death. In comparison with the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations, 
OC has received little attention. This has changed recently with the publication of two 
books: Marie McGinn’s Sense and Certainty (1989) and Avrum Stroll’s Moore and 
Wittgenstein on Certainty (1994), which present a fresh and vigorous interpretation of 
this Wittgensteinian text.
There is perhaps another reason why the unintelligibility of scepticism has lost favour. 
This I think may have something to do with a feeling of antagonism towards 
Wittgenstein’s own disparaging remarks about philosophical problems as arising from 
conceptual confusion. Taking this attitude towards all philosophical problems is, I
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think, false. The measurement problems in quantum mechanics or the ethics of 
euthanasia are not properly represented as linguistic confusions. However, I do think 
Wittgenstein’s attitude towards the problem of the external world is justified. Here it 
seems, is a philosophical problem which is neither generated by any particular problem 
nor would its ‘solution’ eradicate a problem in a particular inquiry. It is, one might say, 
one of the ‘perennial problems of philosophy’, along with the problem of free will and 
the mind/body problem. My feeling is that a Wittgensteinian treatment of these 
perennial problems has lost favour because of a tendency to take his remarks on 
philosophical problems in an unrestricted sense.
There is, however, a preliminary objection to the Wittgensteinian proposal I am 
examining, about which something needs to be said before proceeding. Anyone who 
tells us that we fail to understand what we think we understand takes on the difficult 
burden of demonstrating this failure to us. The sceptical argument does at least appear 
to be intelligible and comprehensible so this would seem to refute Wittgenstein’s 
argument before it even begins:
The fact that we seem to understand the sceptic perfectly well, certainly well enough to 
understand how to argue against him or why so many popular anti-sceptical arguments fail. 
It is therefore difficult for us to convince ourselves that we do not understand the sceptic at 
all: so difficult in fact that the intuitive intelligibility of scepticism creates a severe problem 
for views about meaning that entail its incoherence (Williams, 1996 p.xiv).
Williams is appealing to the evidential role of intuitions. Intuitions are a powerful tool 
in philosophy, (e.g. Putnam’s ‘twin earth’ and Davidson’s swamp man). But intuitions
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are revisable, either by conflicting intuitions or in light of observation and experiment. 
Some intuitions we are unable to revise even when they are wrong, such as our 
everyday intuitions about space and time in light of Einstein’s theory of relativity. The 
significance of intuitions in philosophical argument is therefore difficult to assess.
Nevertheless, Williams is correct. Scepticism is intuitively intelligible, but then 
scepticism also is intuitively wrong. I am not trying to play off these two conflicting 
intuitions against each other; it is more often the case I think that we hear the 
expression “I thought I knew” rather than “I thought I understood”. However, I do not 
think that scepticism is ‘perfectly’ intelligible, which is shown by the fact that we do 
not understand it simply in virtue of proficiency in English. One does not hear 
expressions like “ We know nothing about the external world” or “I do not know I am 
not dreaming” without asking for further elucidation in the way one does not when he 
hears “I do not know anything about molecular biology” or “I’ve won the lottery! I 
can’t believe I’m not dreaming”. While we may seem to understand the first pair of 
expressions, we do not understand them as well as we do the latter pair.
Perhaps, however, Williams’ remark does not just appeal to the intuitive intelligibility 
of scepticism; as evidence for this he points to the fact that so many anti-sceptical 
arguments have failed. The implication here is that in arguing against the sceptic and 
realising where anti-sceptical arguments go wrong, we understand what would be 
relevant grounds for refuting them. The possibility of a debate with the sceptic implies 
a shared vocabulary of the terms used, of concepts like “knowledge”, “doubt”, 
“belief’, etc., and also of the evaluative standards employed for assessing his 
arguments. An ability to see why anti-sceptical arguments fail shows that both sides of
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the debate are understood. Evidence of rational discussion, therefore, seems to 
demonstrate that scepticism possesses some measure of cognitive significance.
While I agree that we must share the same epistemic concepts and standards if 
disagreement is to be possible, it does not follow from this that scepticism is 
intelligible.
For example, if someone tells me he wants to put the moon in his pocket, how am I to 
understand this? Suppose I show him how to do it by placing a photograph of the 
moon in my pocket. He then tells me this is not what he meant, but wants to put the 
actual moon in his pocket. Now, I understand his words, but I do not understand the 
point of his words. This, I suggest, is how we understand the sceptic. The sceptic 
thinks he can, in all seriousness, doubt whether we know we have two hands or that 
we are not dreaming. We understand his words and convince ourselves that we 
understand him because we know what it is to doubt lesser things like whether 
Churchill did this or that during the war or that it will rain tomorrow. It is our non- 
philosophical understanding of the concepts of “knowledge”, “doubt”, etc., which 
provide both the model and the illusion that we understand the sceptic’s argument, just 
as realisable desires serve as a model for understanding fantastic and impossible desires 
like putting the moon in one’s pocket.
These replies only point the way to answering the objection that scepticism is 
intuitively intelligible and I bring them up here as an attempt to calm any nagging 
suspicion from the start that the entire thesis rests on an unavoidable problem.
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SCEPTICISM
The scepticism I shall be concerned with is scepticism about justification, or what we 
have a right to believe. Scepticism about justification is not equivalent to simply 
asserting that any knowledge claim might not be true. Fallibilists contend that, as 
epistemic subjects, we begin with certain prejudices and false beliefs, which we 
subsequently revise through criticism. According to this position, the possibility that 
we may be mistaken about the evidence in favour of a particular belief is compatible 
with the evidence justifying that belief. The premise that our beliefs might not be true is 
not the same as saying that we are systematically wrong in all beliefs. Arguments in 
favour of fallibilism are usually made from past falsity, but any sceptic who argued 
from the past falsity of certain beliefs to pervasive falsity is making a fallacious 
inference. The sceptical argument must be of a different nature.
Scepticism about justification allows that some of our beliefs may be true but denies 
that our normal means for assessing knowledge claims are themselves justified. So, 
although some belief may be true and claimed to be known according to our normal 
justificatory standards, the sceptic denies that the knowledge claim counts as genuine 
knowledge.
He must be careful here. The sceptic must not be seen to depart from the actual usage 
of the concept ‘knowledge’, for it is linguistic usage that provides us with what we and 
other people mean by a term. If he does depart from ordinary usage his arguments are 
irrelevant, for he will not mean by the concept ‘knowledge’ what we mean by it but
will instead have conjured up his own concept out-of-the-blue. His denials of 
knowledge will not contradict our own standards and no paradox will have been 
generated. The sceptical conclusion, therefore, must genuinely conflict with our 
ordinary knowledge claims, and the evaluative standards by means of which we make 
and criticise those claims must be the same standards which give rise to the sceptical 
conclusion itself. Only with these two features is there a genuine paradox in our 
epistemic practices.
Scepticism trades on the assumption that it is always possible that a person is mistaken 
about what he takes himself to know. To give this thought substance, a sceptical 
hypothesis is introduced, such as the dream argument or the possibility that we are 
brains-in-a-vat. These provide alternative descriptions of how our experiences are 
caused, while, as experiencers, we are left unaware as to the true nature of the cause. 
Obviously it is never part of any ordinary knowledge claim that we rule out the 
possibility that we are dreaming or that our experiences are the result of an evil 
scientist stimulating our brains which are kept alive in a vat of nutrients. The sceptic 
accepts this, of course, but adds that this is just because they are set aside as irrelevant 
to the particular inquiry we are involved in. But, even in everyday situations, the 
elimination of specific incompatible possibilities is, he says, an ordinary requirement for 
crediting knowledge. For all practical purposes, scepticism can be ignored. However, if 
we disregard any specific features of a particular inquiry, as when seeking a purely 
philosophical understanding of our knowledge of the world, then the sceptical 
alternative becomes philosophically relevant and must be ruled out. This is because, 
despite the fact that sceptical alternatives are ignored or even considered absurd in
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concrete situations, they still have an epistemic status pertinent to the truth of ordinary 
knowledge claims.
The sceptical argument I want to look at is the one advanced by Descartes in his 
Meditations. Descartes undertakes his hyperbolic doubt not for destructive purposes 
but with the aim of erecting the natural and mathematical sciences upon stable 
foundations. Rather than subject every individual belief to doubt, Descartes decides 
that all beliefs about the external world have a common basis “acquired either from the 
senses or through the senses”. If he has reason to distrust the senses then he has reason 
to doubt all propositions that are acquired through them. I pick up the argument after 
Descartes has just dismissed distrusting the senses on the evidence of a few perceptual 
illusions:
...there are many other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible, even though they are 
derived from the senses -  for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter 
dressing-gown, holding his piece of paper in my hands, and so on....how could it be denied 
that these hands or this whole body are mine? Unless I liken myself to a madman...But such 
people are insane, and I would be thought equally as mad if I took anything from them as a 
model for myself.
As if I were not a man who sleeps at night, and regularly has all the same experiences while 
asleep as madmen do awake...How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar 
events - that I am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire -  when in fact I am lying 
undressed in bed!... As if I did not remember other occasions when I have been tricked by 
exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I think about it more carefully, I see plainly that 
there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from 
being asleep (Descartes First Meditation 18-19,1992).
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Descartes has turned his doubts towards judgments which he initially conceives are 
‘quite impossible’ to doubt. He likens such doubts to the utterances of a madman, 
which, presumably, are not to be considered reasonable. Descartes then recalls that in 
the past he has had dreams vivid enough to convince him that what he was 
experiencing was real. He has dreamt that he was sitting in his dressing-gown and so 
on once before. Where madness failed, dreaming now succeeds in providing grounds 
for doubting what was thought to be quite impossible. He then, without explanation, 
remarks that he cannot conceive of any way to distinguish between a waking 
experience and a dream. Without some distinguishing mark, Descartes is unable to 
eliminate the undesirable possibility that he is now dreaming his entire experience.
It is important that the dreaming possibility, if it is to threaten knowledge, must be 
incompatible with what Descartes takes himself to know, otherwise there will be no 
imperative to exclude it. Yet it is not obvious that dreaming and knowing are 
incompatible, especially when one remembers that knowledge, like other concepts such 
as “belief’, “soluble”, “shyness”, “brittle”, is dispositional. For example, I believe that 
hippopotamuses do not salsa even though I have never consciously had this belief 
before. Or consider the righteous man. He is described as virtuous because of his 
actions, but presumably this person is virtuous even when not performing good deeds, 
as when he is asleep for example. Even if he dreams evil thoughts, this does not detract 
from, or in any way affect, his virtue. So if I dream some proposition, it does not 
thereby follow that I do not know it. I can dream that 2 + 2 = 4 or that 
hippopotamuses do not salsa and still be said to know it.
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But this misses the crucial point Descartes is making. To be justified in asserting that x 
is dispositional assumes that there was a time when the dispositional properties were 
genuinely observed. If I know that dogs of a certain kind have a tendency to bark at 
postmen, this must be because there have been actual occasions when they have done 
so. It may be that the counterfactual statement ‘If my dog were to see a postman, then 
he would bark’ is true, even if he were never to see a postman. However, we would be 
in no position to know whether this statement was true or false unless the character of 
dogs of this kind was witnessed. Generalising this, if no dog of this kind was ever 
known to have barked at postmen, then there would be no grounds at all for claiming 
that any dog of this kind would bark at postmen in certain circumstances. If we are 
going to predicate a dispositional attribute of an object, then there must be some 
evidence of that object possessing the attribute.
This means that if someone is to be credited with some empirical knowledge, there 
must have been some time when he was awake and acquired that knowledge through 
the senses. Therefore the claim that one can know p even if he dreams p, is true, only 
in virtue of the fact that there was a time when that person came to know p while 
awake and through his senses. But if Descartes is correct, and a waking experience 
cannot be distinguished from a dreamt one, then despite his belief that he is awake, this 
cannot be established and he is not to be credited with any piece of empirical 
knowledge.
Now, although we are willing to accept that someone may know a proposition even if 
he dreams it, we do not accept dreaming as a suitable means for acquiring a belief. 
Even if I dream it is raining outside and my dreaming this is caused by the sound of
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falling rain, I do not thereby know it is raining. The fact that p  just seems to play the 
wrong sort of causal role in generating the belief that p. As Stroud says regarding this 
point, it is not easy to say why dreaming is not an acceptable method of generating 
beliefs (Stroud, 1984. p. 15). Nevertheless, I think we work with a clear distinction that 
waking and dreaming are different and that, even if the latter occasionally results in 
true beliefs, dreaming is not to be trusted as a reliable indicator of what happens in the 
external world.
I said that Descartes concludes, without explanation, that he cannot conceive any mark 
by which to distinguish waking experiences from dreaming. The reason for this is 
because anything that is considered as indicating a particular experience as genuine 
could be dreamt as well. We might think that pinching oneself and feeling pain is a 
good sign that one is not dreaming. But it is possible that one can dream pain as well 
and so one could be dreaming the test that is supposed to establish that one is not 
dreaming. The same applies to all possible tests and a regress is generated, whereby for 
any test T which is supposed to establish that one is not dreaming that one knows P, 
we get T*: S is not dreaming that [(S is not dreaming) that (S is not dreaming that P)]. 
The success of any test depends on whether it distinguishes waking from dreaming but 
any test can be dreamt and so no test can be known to be successful.
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It would be useful to summarise in a semi-formal way the sceptical argument just 
presented.
1-It is possible to believe, that for all I know, I am now dreaming that P.
2- If I am dreaming that P, then I do not know that P. 
(Dreaming fails to have the right sort of causal connection.)
3- For me to know that I am not dreaming, there must be some test enabling 
me to tell I am not dreaming.
4 - 1 only know that test is successful if I know I am not dreaming the reliability 
of the test itself.
5- But for every test I perform, it is possible that I am dreaming its reliability.
6- Therefore, I do not now know I am not dreaming.
7- Therefore, I do not now know that P.
The conclusion of the sceptical argument above is conditional and says that empirical 
knowledge is not possible unless the possibility that I am dreaming is eliminated.
What makes the sceptical conclusion so radical is that it affects all our knowledge 
claims, since any test or method we might muster to disprove it is subject to the same 
nagging doubt. This means that the requirement of eliminating alternative possibilities 
is a completely general and universal one. Scepticism therefore places an important 
constraint on any anti-sceptical argument; it regards the advancing of any empirical 
evidence against scepticism as simply begging the question. Now one might object that 
the absence of empirical evidence to either refute or confirm scepticism means that 
scepticism begs the question. One might therefore say, ‘If you exclude empirical 
verification or refutation then of course scepticism follows, for what other evidence is
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there?’ This is not really an objection since scepticism is not claiming that there is any 
other evidence, only that the best evidence we do have is defective.
What the sceptical argument reveals, then, is that there is a methodological 
requirement that we eliminate alternative possibilities incompatible with some 
knowledge claim and there is one possibility, the possibility that I am now dreaming, 
that can throw all knowledge claims into doubt at once.
I said earlier that the sceptic must not distort the ordinary concept of knowledge 
otherwise his conclusion will be irrelevant. Yet Descartes’ argument seems to impose 
upon us a stricter than normal requirement for knowledge. It is never, in ordinary 
circumstances, necessary to eliminate the possibility that we are not dreaming if we are 
to know something. To know that the animal in the zoo is a zebra I must know that it 
is not a camel, for example, but no one would insist that I know I am not dreaming 
before I can know it is a zebra. The task for the sceptic then is to convince us that the 
methodological requirement that we eliminate the possibility that we are dreaming is 
not a distortion of our ordinary concept of knowledge, but is no more than the 
extension of a highly plausible epistemic standard imposed upon ordinary knowledge 
claims.
This is the task Stroud (1984) sets himself in the second chapter of his book on 
scepticism. He takes the charge of distortion seriously and accepts that ruling out the 
dream possibility is not normally considered a condition of knowledge and would 
rightly be treated as outrageous if the possibility was raised as an objection to a 
knowledge claim.
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However, Stroud argues that it is our ordinary understanding of knowledge that is 
responsible for the sceptical possibility. His argument is premised on the distinction 
between its being entirely appropriate to say that S knows p and the truth that S knows 
p. With this distinction, truth conditions and justification conditions come apart to 
unleash the possibility that it is possible to be completely justified in claiming to know 
p but fail to genuinely know it. The importance of the distinction is that it makes 
intelligible the non-epistemic concept of objectivity, which Stroud and Nagel regard as 
built into our ordinary concept of knowledge and which is supposedly responsible for 
generating scepticism.
Stroud illustrates the distinction by means of two examples, both of which are 
supposed to be understood as ordinary knowledge claims. The moral to be drawn from 
these examples is that we ordinarily work with a conception of knowledge which 
distinguishes between it being reasonable to say “I know that p” and it being true that 
one knows that p.
Suppose I am at a party and the host asks me whether John is coming. I reply that he 
is, adding that I know this because I have just spoken to him on the telephone. John is 
well known as a reliable man and so I have good reason to trust him. What neither I 
nor anyone else knows at the party is that John was struck by a meteorite on his way 
over. Yet, coincidentally, my host raises the challenge that perhaps a meteorite will hit 
him. The objection sounds outrageous to me and the rest of the guests, but is the 
challenge irrelevant to my truly knowing that John will arrive? Stroud says:
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A necessary condition of knowledge might remain unfulfilled even though it would be 
outrageous for anyone to assert that it is inappropriate for anyone to criticise my knowledge- 
claim on that basis. The appropriateness or outrageousness might have some source other 
than the falsity of what is said or implied about knowledge. (Stroud 1984, p.62)
According to Stroud, the host’s objection is outrageous because it is apparently 
directed at the grounds for my assertion and not its truth. It is strange that the host 
should even consider the possibility that John will be hit by a meteorite, let alone 
verbally raise it as an objection, especially following my announcement that I have 
spoken to him on the phone a couple of minutes earlier. It would be like someone 
suddenly exclaiming in the middle of a conversation “Down with him!”1, a remark 
uttered completely out of context.
The similarity is not on all fours however. While it was my assertion, and not my host’s 
objection, that was the appropriate thing to say in the circumstances, the objection she 
raises is epistemically relevant to the truth of my claim. If the meteorite possibility were 
actualised, as it was in the example, then this would affect my knowledge since it 
would then be false that I knew John would come to the party. Knowledge does not 
tolerate actual falsity, so if p were false it would be sufficient to deprive a knowledge 
claim from counting as genuine knowledge.
...when someone claims to know something about the world without asking himself or even 
thinking of a certain possibility, and that possibility, if realized would mean that he does not 
know what he claims to know, he might fail to know in that situation precisely because he 
has not eliminated that possibility. I f  there were no special reasons for him to consider that
1 Wittgenstein, On Certainty 350
22
possibility, he might nevertheless be fully justified in saying that he knows. (Stroud, p.63, my 
emphasis)
The situation is supposed to be analogous for scepticism. Ordinarily, the suggestion 
that we don’t know something because we might be dreaming is outrageous and not 
entertained as a serious possibility. Yet as outrageous as the suggestion is, if it were 
true, it would be fatal for knowledge. The fact that the possibility is not normally raised 
as an objection does not mean that it cannot be raised and that it is not a genuine 
objection. It may be true, and the fact that it is never entertained as a possibility does 
nothing to change this. It would be analogously outrageous for me or anyone else to 
make the point that I am not God, for obviously I am not, yet despite the oddness of 
such an utterance, it is true for all that.
I said that Stroud’s argument for the relevance of the sceptical possibility depends on 
the distinction between the conditions that make a knowledge claim true and the 
conditions that justify the making of the claim. He has tried to establish this distinction 
by the example of the party. However, there is disanalogy between scepticism and 
Stroud’s example. I think we can agree with Stroud that a legitimate use of “know” is 
found in the above example. If someone claims to know p and that claim is 
subsequently refuted, then, even though that person had all the right reasons for 
thinking p is true, he did not know p. My objection however is that this sense of 
“know” does nothing for the sceptical cause. Scepticism is not committed to saying 
that all our knowledge is false, only that we have no reason to think that any of our 
beliefs are true. In Stroud’s example we are told that John was hit by a meteorite, so 
naturally we know, when the question of knowledge is raised, that the claim is false.
The distinction between genuinely knowing p and claiming to know p emerges in 
Stroud’s case, from the privileged position of knowing that John’s claim is false. If we 
were not given this information it is not so clear that genuine knowledge would be 
denied. If John had turned up at the party and had not been struck by a meteorite, then 
we would be inclined to say that I did know he would come. Of course, scepticism will 
deny that I do know that John arrives at the party even if it appears that he does. But 
according to the moral of the example, we are only to deny knowing p if it transpires 
that p is false. Given that we have no such privileged position as regards the truth of 
scepticism, the above example cannot serve as a suitable model for scepticism.
It is perhaps because of this that Stroud considers a second case. The advantage of this 
second example is that it does not depend on knowing that the knowledge claim is 
actually false. Rather it is because of some defect in the person’s evidence that his 
assertion is rendered dubitable.
Suppose that during the war people are trained to identify enemy planes by 
distinguishing certain features from the ground using a manual. If a plane is an F, then 
it has features x, y, and z, and it is an enemy aircraft, while if it is an E, it is identified 
by having features x, y, and w, and it is an allied plane. From the ground, this is the 
best method of identifying the two types of aircraft and has a high success rate. If the 
spotter follows this method and it is performed under appropriate conditions, i.e. in 
good visibility, then he is credited with knowing whether a particular plane is an F or 
an E. If, however, visibility was poor or the spotter was a little hasty, such that he 
could only make out features x and y, then, even if he correctly identified an F on the 
evidence of x and y, we would not consider his judgment justified. This would be
because the evidence available to him, and upon which he made the judgment, could 
also have led him to identify the aircraft as type E. In this case, all that he is entitled to 
assert is that the plane could be either an E or an F, but not that it is one or the other, 
and we would not credit him with knowledge.
Now, expanding the scenario slightly, suppose that there is another aircraft, type G, 
which also has features x, y and z but which the plane spotters were not taught to 
identify because it makes the process too difficult. From the ground, it is impossible to 
recognise an F from a G, but G, like E, is an allied plane, so it is not that important. 
The question is, when a spotter identifies a plane as an F  on the basis o f features x, y  
and z, does he know it is an F  even though it could be a G which has the very same 
features? Stroud answers negatively:
Just as he did not know the plane was an F when he had found only features x and y -  for all 
he knew then, it might have been an E -  so he does not know now that it is an F because all 
the features he has now found are also present on another kind of airplane (p.68)
There is an important difference between the two cases, however. In the first example 
the spotter is required to eliminate the possibility that a plane with features x, y could 
be an E. The requirement is important since F is an enemy aircraft while E is an allied 
one. If the spotter only observes features x, y and guesses the plane to be an F, then, 
even if correct, we would refrain from saying he knew the plane was an F and would 
consider him a careless spotter. In the second case, there is no carelessness by the 
spotter since he is under no obligation to eliminate the possibility that what he 
identifies as an F could be a G. It would therefore be appropriate to credit him with
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knowing that the plane is an F.
However, despite the spotter’s right to claim knowledge for himself, and our 
recognising this right as a legitimate one, Stroud denies that the spotter does genuinely 
know. He says:
We recognise that he does not know it is an F even though there is absolutely nothing to be 
gained by pointing his ignorance out to him or to anyone else. For all practical purposes we 
can accept his saying that he knows it's an F....The well-trained airplane spotter is not 
required to rule out the possibility that the plane he sees with features x, y z is a G; nor do his 
teachers or his fellow spotters insist on that possibility’s being eliminated. But we recognise 
that it is nevertheless a condition o f knowing that the plane is an F on the basis ofx, y z  that 
one knows that it is not a G.
(pp.68-69, my emphasis)
The problem here is that the evidence upon which the spotter makes his claim that the 
plane is an F equally supports the possibility that the plane is a G and unless he can 
eliminate this possibility, he does not know it is an F. The spotter is not at fault when 
he identifies a plane as an F on the grounds that it has markings x, y, and z since he has 
no cogent reason to think that the plane is not an F, but a G instead. Nevertheless, says 
Stroud, we recognise a sense of “know” which outstrips the absence of reasons for 
thinking that the claim is false.
The case of the plane spotter still assumes a privileged position on our part, that of 
knowing that planes of type G exist. But, unlike the previous example, we do not 
know whether the identified plane is an F or a G and, what is the crucial difference, we
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do not need to know this in order to know that the spotter fails to satisfy the 
conditions for knowledge. This example, then, seems to serve as more suitable model 
for scepticism than the previous one, for scepticism says that we cannot read off the 
existence of a physical world from the content of experience since the content equally 
points to the hypothesis that such experiences are no more than dreams.
There is of course one major difference between the case of the spotter and the 
sceptical scenario. With the spotter we can discover the weakness in his claim, but not 
so with the sceptic. Never mind, says the sceptic. This is simply the truth in scepticism. 
Obviously there must be a difference between the two cases, but, according to the 
sceptic, this is not a relevant objection. Rather, it is the fact of our epistemic situation.
Suppose however, that the plane the spotter identifies as an F is in fact an F. Surely he 
knows it is an F after all. Stroud has already allowed for the spotter’s claim to be 
justified even though we are not told whether the plane is an F or a G. So suppose it is 
an F and his claim is justified, then the spotter would appear to know that the plane he 
has correctly identified is an F. Indeed, if the spotter’s claim is justified and true, what 
more is needed to turn this into the wine of knowledge?
Stroud is not going to accept this, of course. Even if the spotter is right, we are not 
justified in saying that he knows because he would have believed the plane was an F  
even i f  it was a G given the same evidence. The correctness of his claim is, 
accordingly, accidental, for the evidence fails to discriminate between two 
incompatible alternatives.
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Stroud seems to be appealing to a very strong sense of knowledge here, a sense that is 
not normally in play. It is part of our ordinary practice of making and accepting 
knowledge claims, that, even if the evidence fails to entail the truth of a claim by failing 
to eliminate all possibilities incompatible with it, we still accept that in appropriate 
circumstances such evidence constitutes knowledge. We just do not expect a 
knowledge claim to exclude all incompatible alternatives for it to count as knowledge. 
This is not to say that eliminating alternatives is not an important part of gaining 
knowledge, only that we do need to eliminate all possible ones. Consider the zebra 
case once again: in an ordinary case of knowing that some animals in the zoo are 
zebras, I do not need to know they are not cleverly painted mules in order to truly 
know that the animals are zebras, whereas I do need to know that they are not 
antelopes. The painted mules alternative is simply not relevant in this case. It may, of 
course, in extraordinary circumstances become relevant. For example, if it is known 
that a film crew are in the area and the number of zebras needed for their film is greater 
than the number in the zoo, and so they improvise by painting mules. Now there are 
complications regarding the relevant alternatives account, namely what makes an 
alternative relevant, such as whether the alternatives must be known to the knower, or 
whether they depend on facts about the situation. But the present point is that, in 
ordinary knowledge contexts and from all possible incompatible alternatives, only some 
are deemed relevant, while others are excluded.
Stroud however, has a powerful explanation of both why the sceptical alternatives are 
relevant and why they appear to be irrelevant to ordinary knowledge claims. He says:
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There is a single conception of knowledge at work both in everyday life and in the 
philosophical investigation of human knowledge, but that conception operates in everyday 
life under the constraints of social practice and the exigencies of action, co-operation and 
communication. The practical social purposes served by our assertions and claims to know 
things in everyday life explain why we are normally satisfied with less than what, with 
detachment, we can be brought to acknowledge are the full conditions of knowledge.
(P-71)
Whether an alternative is relevant or not is fixed by the context in which the claim is 
entered and subject to the interests of those using it. These determine what is to count 
as a relevant possibility. What we accept as knowledge in these practical situations is 
not knowledge of the truth, but a weaker ‘for-all-practical-purposes’ kind of 
knowledge. This allows Stroud to argue that the detachment brought about through 
philosophical contemplation reveals the full nature of our ordinary concept of 
knowledge as it really is, free from all practical considerations and restrictions. 
Therefore sceptical possibilities are not raised, not because they are irrelevant to 
whether I have knowledge, but because there is no practical requirement to eliminate 
them. The absence of a ‘special reason’ for thinking that the sceptical possibility might 
obtain does not mean it is not a requirement upon knowledge, (p.63)
I said earlier that Stroud was attempting to illuminate a natural distinction between 
justification conditions and truth conditions. Via the example of the plane spotter he 
has traced the naturalness of this distinction as it figures in our ordinary assessment of 
knowledge claims. In response to the objection that ordinarily we do not expect a 
knowledge claim to exclude every incompatible alternative, Stroud has argued that this 
is due to our ordinary standards being practically constrained. The distinction between
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truth and justification conditions is, therefore, upheld from a purely theoretical or 
objective perspective. The sceptic can be seen to have carved out from our ordinary 
epistemic practices conceptual space from which to damn those practices.
Where does this leave us? Scepticism would seem, as both Stroud and Nagel contend, 
to be rationally compelling and entirely natural. Michael Williams sums up our state of 
play like this:
We must conclude that, if there is a context in which the sceptic’s alternatives are the 
relevant ones, and if that context is what the sceptic says it is -  namely, one created solely by 
detachment from ordinary practical concerns and limitations -  then neither the “relevant 
alternatives” nor any other broadly contextual conception of knowledge and justification will 
make headway against scepticism unless it is backed up by an alternative account of the 
relation between the context of reflection and more ordinary contexts. (Williams 1996, 
p. 189)
It is the relation between ordinary and philosophical knowledge that the rest of this 
paper is concerned with. In the next section, I turn towards G E Moore, who attempts 
to argue that any philosophical view which contradicts certain everyday knowledge 
claims is itself contradictory. Moore is not arguing against the existence of a purely 
theoretical perspective, but he does think that philosophical aims and abilities are 
constrained by ordinary thinking.
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G E MOORE’S ‘DEFENCE OF COMMON SENSE’
G E Moore's 'A Defence of Common Sense' (DCS) was delivered in 1925. In this 
paper he appealed to common sense to show that the grand philosophical doctrines of 
scepticism and idealism were unintelligible. The argument of DCS appears to be 
simple. Moore gives examples of propositions he claims to know with certainty and 
which he thinks nearly everyone, including sceptical philosophers, have also known 
with certainty. He then shows how the doctrines of scepticism and idealism conflict 
with these propositions. Anyone who advances one or both of these philosophical 
doctrines is then guilty of holding two incompatible sets of beliefs.
As I shall show, Moore’s argument fails. However the failure is most fascinating in that 
it raises a host of interesting questions, specifically about the relation between the 
claims of common sense and those of philosophy. This explains, perhaps, the comment 
by one philosopher that DCS is 'one of the few really decisive contributions to 
philosophical enlightenment which this century has given us'.1
Rather than dive straight into the paper itself, I want to begin with an autobiographical 
quote of Moore's. This particular passage is insightful since it gives a clear indication 
of his attitude towards philosophy and philosophical problems in general and will help 
the set the tone for this chapter and the next.
1 Arthur Murphy, ‘Moore’s “Defence of Common Sense’” 1952, p.299
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I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any 
philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me are things which 
other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences.. .the problems in question being 
mainly of two sorts, namely, first, the problem of trying to get really clear as to what on earth 
a given philosopher meant by something which he said, and, secondly, the problem of 
discovering what really satisfactory reasons there are for supposing that what he meant was 
true, or alternatively, was false.
(Schilpp 1952, p. 14)
Although no distinction is clearly drawn, Moore refers to a distinction between 
ordinary everyday thinking and philosophical thinking. For Moore, the things of which 
common sense and science speak are unproblematic as regards their meaning and truth. 
However, the philosopher is someone who uses language in an unordinary way so that 
what he is saying is far from transparent. This attitude towards philosophy and 
common sense runs through Moore's entire philosophical career, but features most 
prominently in DCS.
We have seen the sceptical argument and how it requires a demonstration that the 
methods we use to justify knowledge claims be rationally defensible. The challenge of 
the sceptic, then, is not whether our knowledge claims are true but whether we have a 
right to think they are. Of course, if they are false, then we do not know them, but 
failure to know P is compatible with the truth of P. Descartes may genuinely be sitting 
in his dressing-gown, just as he believes himself to be, and yet not know this fact. 
Idealism on the other hand is in a sense more radical since it maintains that no physical 
object propositions can be true, from which it follows that we cannot know such 
propositions, since the concept of knowledge implies the condition of truth. Descartes
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cannot know he is sitting by the fire if there are no physical objects; what he takes to 
be physical objects are ‘imaginings’ such as one encounters in dreams. Though both 
scepticism and idealism are the targets of DCS, I shall, where appropriate, focus on the 
anti-sceptical arguments.
The first part of Moore’s objective consists of giving examples of propositions that he 
says are “such obvious truisms as not to be worth stating... everyone of which (in my 
opinion) I know, with certainty, to be true.” The list is rather long and so I quote just a 
handful:
The earth has existed for many years.
There exists at present a living human body which is my body.
There exist other things, having shape and size in three dimensions.
There have been and are other living human bodies.
I have been aware of facts, which I was not at the time observing.
There have been other humans who have had many different experiences.
There have lived upon the earth many different species of plants and animals.
Call this list (1). The list divides into propositions, which imply the existence of 
material things, and those which imply the existence of a self or conscious minds. 
Moore is claiming, then, to know for certain the truth of propositions which imply the 
existence of both physical and mental facts.
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As it stands, this is nothing more than the personal statement of a man reeling off 
examples which he claims to know. However Moore goes on to include one further 
proposition, also an ‘obvious truism’. Call it (2):
...each of us... has frequently known, with regard to himself or his body and the time at which 
he knew it, everything which, in writing down my list of propositions in (1), I was claiming 
to know about myself or my body.
Moore is making two claims by introducing (2). First he is saying that the propositions 
which he claimed to know in (1) are also held with the same conviction by most other 
human beings. The propositions in (1) are universally held and comprise what Moore 
calls the ‘Common Sense Conception of the World’ (CSW). This means that the 
propositions Moore cites in (1) are of a special kind. If he had selected say, the capital 
of Peru or the date of the Korean war, then he could not have been sure that others 
would recognise themselves to know these things. Not only this, but they may have 
even challenged his claim to know them at all, especially if he had said he knew, for 
example, the precise temperature at the centre of the earth. The fact, therefore, that he 
cited propositions which everyone would recognise themselves to know removes the 
likelihood of doubt and the request to state how he knows them. The significance of 
the examples is something which struck Wittgenstein and we shall explore this further 
in a later section. However their significance seemed to go unnoticed by Moore. He 
obviously selects the right sort of propositions, ones which command universal 
acceptance, but fails to ask himself what it is about these propositions which have this 
ability. The second point regarding (2) is that, as well as Moore claiming there is
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something called the CSW, he is also claiming that the CSW is true and that he knows 
it to be true.
He sums this point up as follows:
. ..if  we know that they are features in the 'Common Sense view o f the world', it follows that 
they are true', it is self-contradictory to maintain that we know them to be features in the 
Common Sense view, and that yet they are not true. And many of them also have the further 
peculiar property that, i f  they are features in the 'Common Sense view o f  the world' (whether 
we know this or not), it follows that they are true, since to say that there is a ‘Common Sense 
view of the world’ is to say that they are true.
(pp.44-46)
So far then Moore has enumerated a number of propositions, all of which imply either 
the existence of material objects or the existence of conscious selves, which he 
maintains are held by nearly every human being with the same conviction as himself. 
These propositions comprise the fundamental features of the CSW, a system of beliefs 
which Moore knows to be true with certainty.
One should be struck by the absence o f argument. Moore’s claim to know the 
propositions in (1) and (2) has simply been asserted rather than defended. Moore 
would agree of course, replying that (1) and (2) are such obvious truisms as not to be 
in need of argument. He does, however, ask himself whether he really knows or only 
believes in the truth of these propositions, and answers:
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I think I have nothing better to say than that it seems to me that I do know them, with 
certainty. It is, indeed, obvious that, in the case of most of them, I do not know them directly: 
that is to say, I only know them because, in the past, I have known to be true other 
propositions which were evidence for them. If, for instance, I do know that the earth had 
existed for many years before I was bom, I certainly only know this because I have known 
other things in the past which were evidence for it. And I certainly do not know exactly what 
the evidence was. Yet all this seems to me no good reason for doubting that I do know it. We 
are all, I think, in this strange position that we do know many things, with regard to which 
we know further that we must have had evidence for them, and yet we do not know how we 
know them, (p.44)
Moore appears to be saying that a proposition can be known directly or indirectly. If a 
proposition is known indirectly then it is derived from some other proposition which he 
knows to be true. If a proposition is directly known, then it is not derived from another 
proposition but is self-evident. Propositions like ‘The earth has existed long before my 
birth’ are known indirectly, (perhaps by unconscious inference or testimony), which is 
to say they are derivable from other propositions, but Moore is not aware what these 
propositions are.
One might have thought that the propositions belonging to (1) were directly known 
since Moore considers them truisms. What then can be known directly? The answer 
comes later on in DCS and anyone familiar with his philosophy should not be surprised 
to find that sense-data are the ultimate referents or objects of every physical object 
proposition.
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But there is no doubt at all that there are sense data, in the sense in which I am now using 
that term. I am at present seeing a great number of them, and feeling others. And in order to 
point to the reader what sort of things I mean by sense-data, I need only ask him to look at 
his own right hand. If he does this he will be able to pick out something...with regard to 
which he will see that it is, at first sight, a natural view to take that that thing is identical, not 
indeed, with his whole right hand, but with that part of its surface which he is actually 
seeing...to put my view in terms of the phrase ‘theory of representative perception’, I hold it 
to be quite certain that I do not directly perceive my hand; and that when I am said...to 
perceive it, that I perceive it means that I perceive...something which is representative of it, 
namely, a certain part of its surface, (pp. 54-55)
From the text, I think it is clear that Moore is as certain of the existence of sense-data 
as he is of the propositions in (1). But this is an odd position to hold. Representative 
theories of knowledge are notorious for generating scepticism about the external 
world. If physical objects are never directly perceived, then how do we know of their 
existence on the basis of sense-data alone? I am not alone in finding this aspect of 
Moore puzzling.2 He wants to say that both physical objects and sense-data exist and 
that sense-data are part of the surface of physical objects, but this last claim is not 
something he is entirely certain of, since he thinks no adequate analysis of sense-data 
has as yet been given. While this is not particularly important for our purposes, it is 
interesting that Moore fails to acknowledge, or chooses not to see the sceptical 
consequences of holding, a sense-datum theory. For whatever analysis is offered, none 
can be as certain for Moore as the propositions in (1) and (2). Moore therefore seems 
to be saying that he only knows there is evidence for these propositions because he 
knows them and not because he is able to explain how they are derived from the
2 Stroud 1984; Baldwin 1996
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evidence. This is nothing more than an affirmation that he does know these 
propositions. So, in answer to the question whether Moore argues for his knowledge 
claim, the answer is he does not.
This brings us to the crucial distinction Moore draws between the ordinary sense of an 
expression and the giving of a philosophical analysis of the expression. Without this 
distinction, Moore’s claims to know the truth of his propositions will seem inexplicable 
in the face of philosophical objections. Although DCS contains Moore’s fullest 
exposition of the difference between the ordinary sense of an expression and a 
philosophical analysis of it, not much mileage can be extracted from it. But as I said in 
the beginning, DCS stimulates discussion rather than closing it.
Moore’s first remarks on the difference is the following:
Such an expression as ‘The earth has existed for many years past’ is the very type of 
unambiguous expression the meaning of which we all understand. Anyone who takes the 
contrary view must, I suppose, be confusing the question of whether we understand its 
meaning (which we all certainly do) with the entirely different question whether we know 
what it means, in the sense that we are able to give a correct analysis of its meaning. The 
question what is the correct analysis of the proposition meant on any occasion (for, of course, 
as I insisted in defining (2), a different proposition is meant at every different time at which 
the expression is used) by ‘The earth has existed for many years past’ is, it seems to me, a 
profoundly difficult question, and one to which, as I shall presently urge, no one knows the 
answer, (p.37)
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Understanding or ‘grasping’ the meaning of an expression is an unambiguous affair and 
can be understood on every occasion of its use. The analysis of a proposition on the 
contrary, seeks for an understanding of what an expression means on every occasion it 
is used and this is not at all well understood. In Some Main Problems o f Philosophy 
(SMPP), Moore gives a good example of what he means:
A very good instance...is furnished by the word(s) ‘life’, ‘alive’. Who is there who does not 
know what is meant by saying that some men are alive and others dead, sufficiently well to be able to 
say with certainty in ever so many cases that some men are alive and others are dead. But yet, if you 
try to...give an account of the differences between life and death, which will apply in all cases in 
which we say that one thing is alive and another dead, you will certainly find it extraordinarily 
difficult (pp.205-206).
The distinction seems a very convincing one. It is between using a concept and being 
able to analyse logically its relation to other concepts. Moreover, Moore says that an 
ordinary understanding of these sentences is logically prior to philosophical analysis, “it 
is obvious that we cannot even raise the question how what we do understand by it is 
to be analysed, unless we do understand it” (DCS p.37). All the propositions Moore 
cites are to be understood in their ordinary sense, which means anyone who 
understands English will understand what those propositions mean and that they are 
true. Doubting their truth or trying to elicit a more exact meaning of a proposition like 
‘The earth is very old’ is to embark upon philosophical analysis.
The next stage of his argument is to render the vague pronouncements of scepticism 
into a more comprehensible ordinary sense. Now no philosopher has actually denied 
that the earth is very old, that living bodies do not die or that no one has dreams.
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Nevertheless, according to Moore, they have implicitly denied such propositions in 
virtue of affirming particular philosophical doctrines. For what all the common sense 
propositions imply is either the existence of material things, space, time, and self, and 
these are objects or properties which some philosophers have, for different reasons, 
refused to accept as real.
What does it mean to say that material things are not real, or that selves do not exist? 
Moore says that such expressions are vague, but that a clear and correct understanding 
of them would be one that contradicts (2). This would mean that the claim that 
material objects are not real (for example), is logically incompatible with some 
propositions we all recognise ourselves to know with certainty, such as ‘There exist 
human bodies’. So ‘Material things are not real’ entails, for one thing, that no human 
bodies exist. Moore gives another example of translating metaphysical propositions 
into ordinary claims in SMPP. After discussing the possibility that all we know of 
material objects is an orderly succession of our own sensations he remarks:
...it does, in fact, sound veiy plausible. But as soon as you realise what it means in particular 
instances like that of the train -  how it means you cannot possibly know that your carriage is, 
even probably running on wheels, or coupled to other carriages -  it seems to lose all its 
plausibility. (SMPP p. 135)
We see that many metaphysical claims like ‘Material things are not real’, logically 
contradict some ordinary propositions (which imply the existence of material objects), 
the truth of which we all know with certainty. While Moore concedes that not all 
philosophers would intend their claims to be translatable into ordinary concrete terms,
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it is, he thinks, the most natural way to take their expressions if we are to make them 
unambiguous. This, then, is how Moore generates the conflict between the common 
sense propositions in (2) and the claims of scepticism.
The next step is to show how scepticism is an inconsistent position. The argument 
proceeds as follows:
Most philosophers who have held this view, have held, I think, that though each of us knows 
propositions corresponding to some of those which merely assert that I myself have had in 
the past experiences of certain kinds at many different times, yet none of us knows for  
certain any propositions either which assert the existence of material things or which assert 
the existence of other selves, beside myself, and that they also have had experiences.
The philosophical view Moore is referring to is solipsism. While no philosopher has 
actually claimed solipsism is true, some have maintained that it is not logically 
refutable.. Bertrand Russell in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (HKSL) 
defines solipsism as:
The belief that I alone exist. It is not one doctrine unless it is true. If it is true, it is the 
assertion that I, Bertrand Russell, alone exist. But if it is false, and I have readers, then for 
you who are reading this chapter it is the assertion that you alone exist. (Russell 1966, p. 191)
Russell finds himself compelled to accept it on the basis of holding the following two 
principles, one about the nature of logical inference and the other a strict commitment 
to empiricism:
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From a group of propositions of the form “A occurs”, it is impossible to infer by deductive 
logic any other proposition asserting the existence of something. (Russell 1966, p. 194)
What we know without inference consists solely of what we have experienced (or more 
strictly, what we are experiencing). (Russell 1966, p. 195)
To infer from experience is to assume a general law that what has been experienced 
will happen again. Yet deductive logic alone does not license such an inference and, 
according to Russell, there is no other means for rationally making inferences from one 
set of experiences to another and he is therefore uncomfortably unable to refute 
solipsism of the moment.
Moore says about solipsism that, if a philosopher claims that other men like himself 
cannot know anything about the existence of any other human beings, then he 
contradicts himself because:
When he says ‘No human being has ever known of the existence of other human beings’, 
he is saying: ‘There have been many other human beings beside myself, and 
none of them (including myself) has ever known of the existence of other human beings’. 
If he says: ‘These beliefs are beliefs of common sense, but they are not matters of 
knowledge’, he is saying: ‘There have been many other human beings, beside myself, who 
have shared these beliefs, but neither I nor any of the rest has ever known them to be 
true.’ (pfc )^
The solipsist is understood to be contradicting the common sense belief that we know 
of the existence of other human beings. According to Moore, denying this common
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sense belief is self-contradictory. For when the solipsist denies this belief to count as 
knowledge, he makes implicit reference to other human beings who hold beliefs which 
are not known to be true. The solipsist is seen to be committed to the existence of a 
commonly held, but false view and therefore, the existence of subjects who hold such a 
view.
Moore therefore makes the inference from the solipsist’s statement:
No human being has ever known that other human beings exist.
To the implicitly held statement:
Human beings exist
But this inference is fallacious. This is made apparent by the following parallel 
inference. From the statement:
No human being has ever known that unicorns exist.
It would be incorrect to infer:
Unicorns exist
It would be more correct to say that if there are unicorns, then no human being knows 
of their existence. Now Moore does in fact recognise that the solipsist can qualify his 
argument in this way by claiming, that it is possible that i f  there are other humans, then 
they do not know of the existence of other human beings. This has the effect of 
avoiding the contradiction. But he blocks this rejoinder on the grounds that this is not 
what philosophers have meant when advancing the solipsistic position.
However, Russell, in HKSL, understood solipsism precisely in the way Moore denies it 
has been intended by philosophers. There, Russell draws a distinction between
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dogmatic and sceptical solipsism, where the former roughly corresponds to how 
Moore presents it, and says that this deserves no rational consideration. Sceptical 
solipsism, on the other hand, says that nothing is known beyond experiential data and 
is argued for on the basis of Russell’s above two principles. The sceptical solipsist 
therefore leaves open the possibility that there are other men besides himself and so 
cannot be charged with implicitly referring to the existence of other human beings The 
target of Moore’s criticism in DCS is the dogmatic solipsist, a version of solipsism, 
which according to Russell, was rationally defective. The philosopher who defends 
sceptical solipsism is not, therefore, guilty of self-refutation since he does not assert in 
his premise something which he denies in his conclusion and Moore’s stronger 
argument against dogmatic solipsism is logically fallacious. His attempt, therefore, of 
demonstrating the incoherence of scepticism fails.
It is interesting to observe that in Hume’s Philosophy (HP), Moore advances a similar 
argument but draws a slightly different conclusion from that in DCS. He 
acknowledges that the contradiction only follows if the solipsist advances the dogmatic 
version of solipsism, but he only seriously considers sceptical solipsism. In HP, Moore 
lets the conditional response go through and concedes that it is ‘quite impossible to 
prove, in one strict sense of the term, that he does know any external facts’, (p. 160)
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MOORE’S ‘PROOF OF AN EXTERNAL WORLD’
Moore delivered ‘Proof of an External World’ in 1939. In this paper he promises to 
take up Kant’s challenge of demonstrating the existence of things ‘external to the 
mind’. After some conceptual clarification of what he is going to do, Moore formulates 
the following proof:
1- Making a gesture with one hand Moore utters ‘This is a hand’.
2- Making a gesture with the other hand he utters ‘This is a hand’.
3- Therefore, objects external to the mind exist.
After stating his proof, Moore goes on to claim it is a good one. Firstly it satisfies what 
he considers are the three logical conditions of adequacy that every proof must fulfill; 
the conclusion must not be contained in the premises, the premises must be known to 
be true, and the conclusion must follow on logically from the premise. For the moment, 
what is important is that he says it corresponds to the kinds of proof we tend to make 
and accept on a daily basis. Proofs of the kind Moore has just given, are normally 
sufficient to remove any doubt there may have previously been on a particular 
question. For example, as an answer to the question how many misprints are there on a 
page, one could point and say here is one misprint and here another. The proof is 
successful of course only if it is agreed that what is singled out as a misprint is in fact a 
misprint. That this method counts as a proof is evidence that misprints can be identified 
by pointing to them. If we can identify misprints by this method, then why not hands? 
Surely one can be more certain that he has identified a hand than a misprint. So what
makes Moore’s proof a good one is that it reflects the kind of proofs we ordinarily 
make and accept.
Yet Moore’s proof seems all too quick and the sceptic’s reply is not hard to 
precipitate. He will say that Moore only establishes that two objects exist, not that two 
physical objects exist. What the sceptic/idealist sees when Moore holds up two hands 
is just a collection of visible properties and not something further called a physical 
object. For the idealist, ‘matter’ is a kind of convenient fiction term, which refers to a 
collection of visible properties. In fact, all we are presented with, according to him, is a 
collection of visible properties in which nothing points to the existence of a physical 
thing. So Moore is appealing to a visual object when it is quite clear that scepticism 
was initiated by reflection upon the objects of perception. The point the sceptic/idealist 
is making is not that what Moore waves about is not a hand, but whether it is a 
material hand, whether it is the kind of thing that has the spatial properties associated 
with material objects. It is odd then, that Moore offers an empirical proof for the 
existence of physical objects when he must have surely known that his proof is 
effective only once it has been established that hands are physical objects. Once this is 
done, examples can be pointed to just as they were with the misprints.
What is commonly known as Moore’s proof of an external world only takes up the last 
three pages of a twenty-three page essay. Most of the essay deals with drawing a 
distinction between objects which are mind-dependent and those which are not. By the 
time he gets to the proof, it is supposed to be established that a hand is external to the 
mind and is therefore a physical object. All the proof does is to point to two objects 
which have already been conceptually distinguished as physical objects.
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Moore’s proof then is not purely empirical, but also conceptual. Now there is nothing 
out of the ordinary about a proof like this. The example of misprints was also empirical 
and conceptual. In order to identify a misprint, the correct spelling must already have 
been settled. Once the correct spelling of a word has been laid down, then the 
empirical question about the misprinting of a particular word, or how many misprints 
of a particular word there are on a page, can be answered. We might then think that 
Moore’s proof succeeds. For by the time he points to his hand we know it has already 
been established as a physical object. So we should recast Moore’s original argument 
like this:
1- Things to be met with in space are physical
2- Hands are things to be met with in space
3- Therefore hands are physical things
4- Physical things are external to the mind
5- “Here is one hand”
6- “Here is another hand”
7- Therefore there exist things external to the mind
While this is a more accurate representation of his argument, we are thrown into 
disarray on the last two pages by Moore’s own comments regarding its achievement. 
Instead of clarifying the proof, they serve to confuse the reader. He rightly locates the 
sceptic’s dissatisfaction with whether he knows the truth of his premises and not 
whether he has drawn a valid logical distinction between objects which are supposed to
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be external to the mind and those which are not. Moore understands perfectly well the 
sceptical challenge. What the sceptic wants is:
not merely a proof of these two propositions, but something like a general statement as to 
how any propositions of this sort may be proved. This, of course, I haven’t given; and I do 
not believe it can be given: if  this is what is meant by proof of the existence of external 
things, I do not believe that any proof of external things is possible. How am I to prove now 
that ‘Here’s one hand, and here’s another’? I do not believe I can do it. In order to do it, I 
should need to prove for one thing, as Descartes pointed out, that I am not now dreaming 
(p. 149).
What is going on? Is this an admission of defeat? We were promised an end to the 
‘scandal’ Kant despairs of, supposedly by means of a proof of the existence of the 
world. Moore then boasts not just one, but a number of proofs able to establish the 
existence of the world. All these proofs are vouched as valid, but, by his own 
admission, do not refute the sceptical challenge, for to do this he would have to prove 
that he is not dreaming.
Malcolm (1990) has remarked that Moore is not making any concession to the sceptic 
here at all, but is expressing the point that scepticism is unintelligible. He says:
...it is more plausible to credit Moore with the insight that a philosopher who wants a proof 
of the existence of an external world is asking for something he knows not what -  a ‘general 
statement’ describing how any particular physical -object proposition might be 
proved.. .There is no place for a proof. The most one could do is to shake philosophers out of 
their notion that there is a problem. I think that, at the deepest level, Moore was trying to do 
just that in his ‘Proof, (pp.362-363)
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Now not only does Malcolm read into Moore’s paper what is not there, but the paper 
explicitly rejects this interpretation. Moore does not think that, because no proof is 
empirically possible, scepticism is therefore unintelligible. In fact, Moore’s ‘Proof is 
more modest than an outright refutation of scepticism. For he closes the paper with the 
remark that:
those, if any, who are dissatisfied with these proofs merely on the ground that I did not know 
their premises, have no good reason for their dissatisfaction.
(p. 150, my emphasis)
Moore is therefore arguing that the sceptic is unreasonable and not unintelligible. It is 
not obvious, that because we do not know what a proof of an external world would 
look like, that questioning its existence makes no sense. At least it was not obvious to 
Moore.
Apart from the impossibility of a ‘proof, Moore has a second reason for rejecting 
scepticism as unreasonable. He says it is mistaken to think, if you cannot prove that 
you know your premises, that you do not know them and, therefore, that the proof 
was inconclusive. If this is the objection, then, from a practical point of view, Moore is 
correct.
We do not expect someone to be able to prove everything which they claim to know 
before accepting what they say. If I am proving to you what time the train leaves by 
showing you a timetable, you will not expect me to prove the reliability of the 
timetable, unless you have some further reason to doubt it.
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Despite the general correctness of the these remarks, the sceptic is not silenced by 
them. Firstly, the fact that the dreaming hypothesis cannot be refuted does not make it 
any less true that our actual experiences are as the sceptic supposes. Our inability to 
come up with a proof is symptomatic of our restricted epistemic situation.
The sceptic can also accept Moore’s second point and, as in the Japanese art of 
Aikido, use its force against him. We accept a person’s knowledge claim even though 
he offers no proof for what he knows in ordinary situations unless we have a reason to 
doubt what we are being told. If a doubt is raised, then there is some obligation to 
answer it. In compliance with this, the sceptic raises a doubt about Moore’s ability to 
know that ‘this’ is a hand. Given the intelligibility of the dreaming possibility as an 
objection to Moore’s knowledge claim, he is therefore faced with the obligation of 
presenting a proof. The fact that neither he nor anyone else can offer one shows, not 
that scepticism is unintelligible, but that Moore’s knowledge claim is unjustified.
Both McGinn (1989) and Baldwin (1990) offer a fleeting defense of Moore based on 
what Baldwin dubs the argument from ‘differential certainty’. The argument is found 
being expounded by Moore in his article ‘Hume’s Philosophy’ in his Philosophical 
Papers which McGinn quotes:
There is no reason why we should not...make our philosophical opinions agree with what we
necessarily believe at other times. There is no reason why I should not confidently assert that
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I really do know some external facts, although I cannot prove the assertion except by simply 
assuming I do. I am, in fact, as certain of this as anything, and as reasonably certain of it.1
The argument from differential certainty states that we are more certain we have 
knowledge than we are of any philosophical theory which either explains how we have 
it or denies that we have it. In effect, the argument eliminates the need for any 
philosophical legitimisation of ordinary knowledge claims at all.
It is undeniable that there is no question of Moore’s certainty here or even that it is 
rational for him to believe what he is certain of. The question is whether appealing to 
this certainty constitutes a rationally persuasive move against the sceptic. The answer 
must be it does not. The appeal to certainty does not constitute a rational defence 
according to the ordinary standards of argumentation, and because, as I have 
previously argued, scepticism reaches its conclusion by means of ordinary standards, 
the argument from differential certainty fails to be philosophically persuasive as well. 
The reason this argument fails is because, when a knowledge claim is made and a 
doubt about it entered, it is not sufficient to simply go on affirming that one is certain 
of it. I am of course repeating the previous objection, but from the differential certainty 
argument, we can see that certainty functions differently from knowledge. Moore is 
entitled to his certainty, but he cannot use it to argue against the sceptic without 
begging the question.
In the article by Malcolm from which I have already quoted, he describes Moore’s 
‘Proof as “one of the most amazing, and even comical, scenes in the history of
1 McGinn p.47
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philosophy. Moore’s audacity in trying to prove to an assembly of learned philosophers 
that external objects exist, by holding up one hand and then another, was astounding”, 
(p.3 60) Malcolm also goes on to say how impressive it was. I think one cannot help 
but feel these conflicting tendencies in the paper. While Moore’s proof was a failure, 
the failure is more insightful than other philosophers’ successes. More than anything 
else, Moore gets us to experience the conflict between scepticism and our ordinary 
everyday judgments, a conflict which Wittgenstein spent his professional career trying 
to dissolve.
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WITTGENSTEIN AND THE NONSENSE OF THE SCEPTIC
INTRODUCTION
The stimuli for OC were Moore's two papers, DCS and PEW. As we have seen, in 
those works Moore responds to the sceptic by claiming that he does know precisely 
that which the sceptic denies. Moore thought that any philosophical account which 
attempted to explain how knowledge of the world is possible should preserve 
knowledge and not undermine it. Hence any philosophical explanation that entails 
scepticism should be rejected for this very reason. As we have seen, Moore's defence 
is unacceptable because it begs the question rather than answering it. The fact that 
scepticism contradicts ordinary knowledge claims is no more than an observation; I 
avoid calling it a mere observation for the point is an insightful one, but it cannot, by 
itself, stand as a criticism of scepticism. While dogmatism is a serious misdemeanour in 
philosophy, I think in this case at least, it has not been wasteful. The arguments which 
need addressing have been highlighted by their very neglect. The contradiction 
between common sense and scepticism, which Moore grasped with clarity, cries out 
for further understanding. This means that if common sense is correct -  if we do know 
many propositions to be true with certainty as Moore declared -  then we need to know 
what it is about common sense that makes it correct, or at least safe from the sceptical 
conclusion. I agree that OC presents us with an increased understanding of these 
issues, which I hope to bring out in this section.
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Wittgenstein does not simply appeal to facts of ordinary linguistic usage, though he 
does make much use of concrete examples of how we apply our epistemic concepts in 
all sorts of situations. But he does not appeal to these examples as a means of showing 
that our common sense judgements are correct. He differs here from Moore. 
Wittgenstein is not defending the beliefs of common sense, but is more concerned with 
a clarification of the concepts used to express those common sense beliefs. He does 
deny that we can doubt whether this object before me is a hand, but this is not because 
I do know it is a hand, a la Moore. Moore had defended a common sense epistemology 
from within common sense itself, but Wittgenstein offers a broader picture of our 
relation to our ordinary system of judgements about the world.
THE BEGINNING
In the debate between Moore and the sceptic, what impressed Wittgenstein most were 
the nature of the particular examples under discussion and the role they were supposed 
to play in the argument.
Recall that Descartes began his method of doubt by wondering whether he could 
question whether he was sitting by the fire in his dressing gown. He chose this example 
because he had initially considered it indubitable. Here was a case where neither 
expertise was involved, nor complicated inferences, nor reliance on the testimony of 
any one else. If Descartes could doubt this, then he could not be sure of anything. 
Moore chose the same kind of example but turned it on its head when he declared to 
know that he possessed two hands. Although he realised there was no contradiction in
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denying he knew this, he could not bring himself, in the way Descartes did, to doubt 
such a proposition.
Both parties then had selected an example of something they considered themselves to 
be in the best possible position to say they knew, but reaching different conclusions. 
According to Moore, Descartes' doubts were artificial and absurd and to Descartes, 
Moore's affirmations would appear presumptuous and dogmatic. The examples cut 
both ways. Was this significant or just a red herring?
To Wittgenstein they signalled something odd as well as interesting, in the debate 
between Moore and the sceptic. He thought Moore was right: it is absurd to doubt 
such things as whether I have two hands or that I am not awake but dreaming instead. 
Yet he was unable to go along with Moore's repeated insistence that he knew them. 
The debate between Moore and the sceptic had brought to the surface a very 
significant and special class of propositions, propositions that appear impossible to 
doubt and strange to boast knowledge of.
Wittgenstein’s general criticism of the Moore/sceptic debate is that, in the 
philosophical context, it is a mistake to treat the disputed propositions as items of 
knowledge for which there could be evidence. I stress in the philosophical context 
because Wittgenstein allowed for occasions, all be it highly extraordinary ones, where 
these propositions could be regarded as items of knowledge. His objection is directed 
against the philosophical use of these propositions, in so far as they are used to 
support or reject a metaphysical thesis.
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Moore was correct on at least one point, however: no doubt about the propositions he 
affirmed is ever ordinarily entertained. Where he went wrong was to conclude that the 
absence of doubt about p, (where p is a Moore-type proposition), entails that one 
knows that p. If p is a Moore-type proposition and one cannot normally be said to 
know or doubt that p, then what is its status? Wittgenstein’s answer is that such 
propositions are certain and, most importantly, their certainty is not something 
dogmatic or lacking justification.
THE CORRECT AND INCORRECT USE OF ”1 KNOW”
We have had occasion to notice the puzzling nature of Moore’s anti-sceptical remarks. 
On the one hand, Moore is attempting to answer the sceptic, and as such he is in 
philosophical combat. On the other hand, he is defending what he thinks are our 
ordinary knowledge claims. While Moore did not think one had to be a philosopher to 
say he knew such things as whether he had two hands or that he was wearing clothes, 
it is only a philosopher who would say such a thing. Moore put himself in a difficult 
position. To deny he knew them would make him sound idiotic, but affirming them in 
the face of the sceptic would be question-begging.
Wittgenstein was perplexed by Moore’s use of “I know” for the propositions he 
enunciated. Moore seemed to be conflating knowledge with certainty. He seemed to 
think that because he could not be mistaken in his certainty that p, that this guaranteed 
the truth of p (OC 21). If someone knows that p, then the truth of p is guaranteed,1 but
1 I do not understand why Genova (1995) says that Wittgenstein denies knowing p entails the truth of 
p (p. 189). One can discern in OC a struggle to rectify this conceptual truth with the expression “I
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the truth of p is not guaranteed by the use of “I know p”. One can claim to know what 
he likes, but this does not make it true that he knows it, as Wittgenstein remarks, “It 
would surely be remarkable if we had to believe the reliable person who says “I can’t 
be wrong”; or who says “I am not wrong”. (OC 22) The use of the verb ‘to know’ is 
highly specialised (OC 11).
Wittgenstein gives us some idea what he considers to be the correct use of the 
expression “I know”. He is not here contributing to the traditional analysis of the 
concept of knowledge, whereby a set of necessary and sufficient conditions are laid 
down and then tested against our intuitions. Such an approach would contravene 
Wittgenstein’s ‘family-resemblance’ notion of a concept (Philosophical Investigation 
(PI) 65, 66). By the correct use of “I know”, Wittgenstein is instead offering us 
reminders of how in fact we do use the concept.
Wittgenstein gives three examples for the correct use of "I know". In each case 
grounds are cited:
The correct use of the expression "I know". Someone with bad sight asks me: "do you believe 
that the thing we can see there is a tree?" I reply " I know it is; I can see it clearly and am 
familiar with it". -A: "Is N.N. at home?"-I: "I believe he is." -A: "Was he at home yesterday?" 
-I: "Yesterday he was-I know he was; I spoke to him." - A: "Do you know or only believe that 
this part of the house is built later than the rest?” - 1: “I know it is, I got it from so and so." 
(OC 483)
thought I knew”, but in OC 549, the passage Genova cites as evidence, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects 
her claim.
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Two important features about the correct use of "I know" are being made here by 
Wittgenstein. Firstly, each time "I know" is used, grounds for the claim are mentioned 
as well. In fact, the use of "I know" could be dropped altogether and replaced by “ My 
grounds for p are...” (OC 564). Secondly, the giving of grounds is a response to an 
expressed doubt which requires the claimant to demonstrate how he knows and so 
remove the doubt. By saying how one knows, one makes it possible for another to 
judge whether one does know.
If someone... knows something, then the question “how does he know?” must be capable of 
being answered. And if one does answer this question, one must do so according to generally 
accepted axioms. This is how something of this sort may be known (OC 550-551).
There is nothing particularly contentious in what Wittgenstein is saying here. Clearly, 
just affirming “I know p” is not sufficient by itself to justify saying S knows p. Neither 
is the truth of p sufficient either, for one may be right about p, but for all the wrong 
reasons. What is important are the grounds for claiming p or being in a position to 
know that p. The idea of ‘being in a position to know’ or having grounds for a given 
claim carries in its wake the possibility of error (Genoa 1995, p. 193). It means being 
situated in a causal environment, open to deception, restrictions and changes in that 
environment, “it is always by favour of Nature that one knows something” (OC 505).
Moore confessed an inability to provide any evidence for his affirmations. Yet he 
considered himself justified in saying he knew them because he thought the 
requirement to say how one knows is not universal. While he is correct to say that in 
ordinary cases “I know” does not always require saying how one knows, it is difficult
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to see how this could be of any help to him against the sceptic. Let’s look at a few uses 
of “I know” where grounds are not required and see if Moore could have used any of 
these.
Suppose I have tipped over a box of matches and, holding the empty box in one hand, 
I pick up the matches in the other. Watching me, my friend says, "You do have two 
hands!", "I know I have two hands" I reply. Here the use of "I know" states that I do 
not need reminding. Another case where evidence is not required would be one that 
expresses competence; suppose someone is injured by a car in the street and a passer­
by shouts "Help! Is anyone here a first-aider" and I reply "Yes, I know how to perform 
first aid". A further case would be one where it is used to express agreement: "It was a 
tragedy that so and so died so young", "I know", say I. Or "I know" may be used to 
assure someone, "Don't worry, I know the band will arrive on time". None of these 
uses involves explicit reference to evidence.
While these are acceptable uses of know, this does not mean they fail to satisfy 
Wittgenstein's two requirements for a knowledge claim because, in these cases, the 
person using “I know” is not challenged or questioned in any way to produce evidence. 
He is under no obligation to say how he knows, and, therefore, uses “I know” 
appropriately and innocuously. If the question is "Do you know?" or " Are you sure?", 
then "Yes, I am sure", "I know" are acceptable answers. If however, I am asked, 
"How do you know it is Tom's birthday?" then I must explain how I was in a position 
to know this. Similarly if challenged, I must be able to justify my claim that I know first 
aid or that the band will arrive on time. If the knowledge claim is something we all
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agree on then, we must be able to ask ourselves, if challenged, (say by the sceptic), 
how it is that we could all come to know the same thing.
Perhaps then, it was one of these substitutes Moore had in mind when he addressed his 
audience. However it does not appear appropriate for Moore to use “I know” to prefix 
the class of propositions he affirmed. If “I know” is used as a reminder, what would it 
be like to forget that one has two hands. Moore carefully selected his examples 
precisely because no competence was involved and he thought nearly every human 
being familiar with the English language would assent to them also. This then excludes 
the use of “I know” to express competence that one knows one is wearing clothes.
That Moore was addressing the sceptic as well as his non-sceptical audience must rule 
out his use of "I know" to express agreement. All this would have achieved is to show 
the sceptic to hold a minority position while failing to demonstrate the correctness of 
the majority view. As for expressing assurance, the sceptic never doubted that we all 
assent to Moore's propositions or even the integrity of Moore's assurance. But this is 
just seen as irrelevant to the question of his knowing. What interests the sceptic are 
Moore's reasons and whether those reasons admit of doubt or not. Wittgenstein’s 
perplexity over Moore’s use of “I know” comes down to the fact that he is unable to 
conceive of a context in which one would say “I know” for imparting information or a 
context for doubting them.
From Wittgenstein’s remarks on the concept of knowledge we see that the correct use 
of “I know” essentially involves the possibility of error and the need for grounds. But 
the propositions Moore affirmed do not satisfy either criterion. We seem to have a
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special class of propositions for which the concept of knowledge, as Wittgenstein 
understands it, is not applicable. Moore’s affirmations have the form of empirical 
propositions, but for which no grounds exist and about which no question or doubt is 
ever raised.
The propositions...which Moore retails as examples of such known truth are indeed 
interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because 
they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgements. (OC 137)
When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical 
propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a 
peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions. (OC 136)
What then is the role of these special propositions and how do they differ from other 
empirical propositions?
THE STRUCTURE OF OUR SYSTEM OF EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS
Here is a recent statement from the Government’s chief scientific advisor, Sir Robert 
May2
You can't say anything is safe. You can say two and two is always four; because that sort of 
definition is built into the structure and nature of the system but you can't say, with 100 per 
cent confidence, that the sun will rise tomorrow.
2. The Guardian February 23 1999
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May is alluding to the commonly made distinction between mathematics and empirical 
knowledge. The distinction is drawn by means of the apparent absolute certainty 
enjoyed by mathematics as contrasted with the mere probability of empirical 
knowledge. May characterises the certainty of a mathematical proposition like 2 + 2 = 
4 by saying it belongs to the structure of the system, the implication here being that our 
empirical system of beliefs have no certainties which play the same structural role.
It is this homogenising of all empirical beliefs to a single logical type which, for 
Wittgenstein, marks the first step towards scepticism. For the idea that ‘nothing is safe’ 
gives the false impression that one can doubt the entire system at once. Of course, 
philosophers have always posited a structure to our empirical beliefs, distinguishing 
basic from non-basic beliefs. The existence of a class of basic beliefs has usually been 
posited as a means for dealing with the infinite regress of justification3. While it is more 
controversial to deny a structure than to assert one, what is novel about Wittgenstein is 
his account of the nature of the foundations which serve as a terminating point for 
justification.
Two themes dominate and distinguish Wittgenstein from the more traditional 
foundationalist position associated with Descartes. Firstly, “justification”, says 
Wittgenstein, must come to an end (OC 192), “but the end is not certain propositions’ 
striking us as immediately true; i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our 
acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game” (OC 204). As a way of dealing 
with the infinite regress of justification, Wittgenstein does not posit a class of basic
3 If S knows that p, then he must be able to justify his belief that p by appealing to another proposition 
q. But then q must be justified by another proposition r and so on.
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beliefs which are somehow self-evident or self-warranted. In fact, as we shall see later, 
there is good reason for not regarding them as propositions at all. Secondly, the 
structure of knowledge is holistic:
When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a 
whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole) (OC 141)
No single proposition, therefore, could act as a foundation for our entire system of 
knowledge, because every proposition is connected with some other proposition. It 
makes no sense for Wittgenstein, as it did for Descartes, to think that the cogito could 
stand independent of the rest of knowledge. Of course, this does not mean that all 
beliefs are on a par, we must distinguish between knowledge and certainty, where the 
latter refers to our way of acting. As we shall see later, the mystery of Wittgenstein’s 
account is the relationship between the certainties of action and empirical beliefs.
Wittgenstein calls those propositions that are certain and fundamental ‘hinge 
propositions’ and these are contrasted with more standard empirical judgements.
That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in 
deed not doubted.
If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 341-343).
Wittgenstein makes a number of claims regarding hinge propositions. They cannot be 
justified or doubted (OC 110, 125, 243), but are necessary for doubting and resolving
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problems. One cannot therefore doubt a hinge proposition without a particular 
epistemic practice collapsing. It makes no sense to speak of a mistake regarding a 
hinge proposition (OC 25, 32, 138, 155). To do so is a symptom of mental 
derangement and not of being in error (OC 155, 231, 257). Hinge propositions are not 
empirical, we did not arrive at them through investigation or on the basis of evidence 
(OC 94, 95, 240, 298). Some hinge propositions can, in certain circumstances, 
function as empirical propositions, while others stand fast absolutely. They do not 
function as hypotheses, but belong to our ‘world-picture’ (OC 167).
I shall illustrate a hinge proposition by means of two examples:
EXAMPLE 1
Suppose I am planning to buy some furniture for my living room and I decide to 
measure the height of my doorway so as to have an idea of whether I shall be able to 
manoeuvre the furniture through it. I measure the doorway and it stands at 2m. 
Suppose that now a philosopher raises doubts about the accuracy of my initial 
measurement of the door. While I am certain no mistake has been made, to appease 
him I bring out my tape measure and check again. I even invite him to check for 
himself and, unsurprisingly, the door measures 2 metres. Normally, that is non- 
philosophically, we should be perfectly satisfied with this, but the sceptic is not 
satisfied by what we actually do but with whether what we do is justified. If he pushes 
his doubts about the height of the door after we have checked the answer, then what 
he is questioning is whether we are justified in accepting the reading of the tape 
measure. Such a doubt is not impossible; perhaps he knows that my tape measure was 
made by a company whose machines imprecisely cut their measuring materials. It is
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possible, then, that I could have made a mistake, but it also remains possible for the 
mistake about the height of the door to be eliminated. Even if the sceptic distrusts all 
measuring implements, there is one ruler, the standard metre rod in Paris, which, if I 
had access to it, could positively determine the height of the door. Even a bad 
workman could not blame this tool. This is because the standard metre does not 
function in the way other rulers do. It’s not that it is more accurate, rather it stands as 
an exemplification o f ‘a metre’.
It has this special paradigmatic status, but not because of any intrinsic property such as 
being more accurate than any other object of one metre. Indeed, it would be a kind of 
nonsense to ascribe or deny the property of being a metre to the standard metre rod, 
for ‘the standard metre rod is one metre’ does not describe a fact, but prescribes a 
standard. This does not mean its status cannot change.
The standard metre rod could function as an object to be measured as well as a 
standard ruler, for example, by a laser beam4, but even then, the laser beam takes on 
the role of a correct standard and the distinction between propositions which are tested 
and those which stand fast re-emerge.
When the standard metre functions as a rule, it is not used to justify the length of any 
particular object, in the way the height of the door was used to test the height of the 
statue. Rather it is the standard against which our ordinary rulers conform, so that 
doubting it entails doubting the results of all measuring and, in consequence, one does 
away with the idea of correct and incorrect measurements as we understand them.
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Without any agreed criterion of what a metre is or any other unit of measurement, it 
becomes impossible to determine the length of one object by means of another. We 
could never determine the length of a room, the height of a person, or the distance 
between two cities. Therefore, we could never calculate how long it would take to 
travel from one destination to another.
EXAMPLE 2
Consider the following two statements:
(1) The earth has existed for over a hundred years
(2) Napoleon fought at the battle of Waterloo in 1816
Without (1), not only could (2) not possibly be true, but the idea of historical inquiry 
would collapse into chaos and confusion. (2) is a contingent statement which happens 
to be true and for which there exists documentary evidence, but while it could not 
possibly be true without (1), it is not the case that (1) supports the truth of (2) in any 
epistemic sense. What makes (2) true is some other contingent proposition or set of 
propositions, which themselves depend upon (1) if they are to play their particular 
epistemic role.
The proposition that the earth has existed for over a hundred years has a special 
relationship to proposition (2) and propositions like (2). For every piece of historical 
information depends upon (1), but is not supported by it. One cannot infer from the 
earth having existed over a hundred years the truth of (2). (1) makes (2) possible
4 Hans -Johann Glock 1996 p214. ‘Necessity and Normativity’.
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without making it true. We can put this by saying that (1) determines what can be true 
and false but not what is true or false.
While it is the case that (1) can logically be derived from (2) if (2) is true, (2) cannot 
epistemically establish the truth of (1). If (2) is true for example, then this entails the 
existence of the earth upon which Napoleon fought and the date of the battle implies 
that the earth has existed for over one hundred years. So from the words contained in 
the contingent proposition ‘ Napoleon fought at Waterloo in 1816’ we can derive (1) 
which is a necessary condition for the truth of (2). However, despite this logical 
relation, (2) cannot epistemically support (1). For if (1) is a necessary condition for the 
truth of (2), then (2) cannot be established as true without first establishing the truth of
(1), which, as we shall see, is not something that can be done. Even if (1) could be 
shown to be true, its truth would not support the truth of (2) since we can neither 
logically nor epistemically derive (2) from (1).
While the two types of examples I have given share the outer appearance of empirical 
judgements like ‘this door is one metre’, ‘this rock is over a hundred years old’, they 
have the function of a priori propositions.
Both the standard metre rod and ‘the earth has existed for over a hundred years’ are 
necessary requirements for the possibility of carrying out their respective inquiries. Yet 
they are different ‘kinds’ of hinges. The standard metre, as its name suggests, is an 
example or paradigm with the aim of establishing a universal standard for 
measurement. No doubt it was introduced to eradicate some sort of problem. But ‘the
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earth is over a hundred years old’ is not a standard of, or for, anything and was clearly 
not introduced to solve any problem or disagreement.
One important difference between these two hinge propositions, however, is that the 
standard metre is fixed relative to the practice of measurement and, as we have seen, 
may be subject to alteration. It is even possible that an entirely new system of 
measurement may evolve, as long, that is, as there is some regularity in the rigidity of 
objects. The same cannot be said of ‘the earth has existed for over a hundred years’. 
There may be disputes about exactly how old the earth is, whether it is five or six 
billion years old for example, but not whether it is more than one hundred years old. 
This hinge proposition therefore ‘stands absolutely fast’.
The class of propositions which cannot be doubted is itself not homogeneous. The 
‘world-view’ is multi-layered and pulsating, a criss-crossing of individual belief- 
systems and public disciplines, all held in place by a few unalterable certainties. As we 
mature and become acculturated we shall acquire our own set of hinge propositions, 
some of mine will be different from some of yours, and others we all share. 
Wittgenstein makes use of the following metaphor to characterise the dynamic of this 
system:
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were 
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened 
but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and 
hard ones became fluid (OC 96)...the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish
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between the movements of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though 
there is no sharp division of the one from the other. (OC 97)
And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an 
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away 
or deposited. (OC 99)
Some hinge propositions are unalterable while others are relative to contexts, practices 
or individuals and become part of the (empirical) waters. A hinge proposition which 
has become part of the river-bed is ‘Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade’ (OC 338) 
while ‘no one has been to the moon’ (OC 106), is now part of the waters. More 
personal hinge propositions include: ‘I have never been to China’ (OC 333) and ‘I have 
two hands’, while ‘This is red’ or ‘The letters A and B are pronounced like this’ (OC 
340) can be seen to constitute correct standards for judging linguistic competence. The 
various layers are also related to each other, for example, if no one has been to the 
moon, then neither have I. But personal certainties are not always dependent on public 
ones, so even though some men have been to the moon, I can still be sure that I have 
not5. Personal certainties are still hinges because even though no public practice is 
undermined, if I was unsure what my name was or whether I had been to China, then 
not only would faith in my own judgement begin to sway, but other people would feel 
intellectually distant from me.
Despite the different levels in generality of hinge propositions, doubting them is not 
something we normally do and which would be extremely odd to attempt. But our not 
doubting them is not, says Wittgenstein, “something akin to hastiness or superficiality”
5 Moore was therefore wrong to include personal certainties as belonging to what he called ‘the 
common sense conception of the world’.
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(OC 358), rather we are to conceive them “as something that lies beyond being 
justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal” (OC 359). I take this to mean 
that hinge propositions are non-epistemic. We do not refrain from doubting hinge 
propositions because we know them. Rather, they do not lack justification but stand 
outside epistemic application. Wittgenstein likens this certainty to the certainty a cat 
has about the existence of a mouse, or the infant’s certainty that milk exists (OC 478), 
the point of comparison being that such a certainty does not require any cogitation or 
linguistic competence.
The non-epistemic status of hinge propositions becomes more apparent if we recall my 
earlier ‘example 2’. We saw that it was not possible for the truth of a contingent 
historical proposition to epistemically support the existence of the earth since it must 
be already certain that the earth exists for the historical claim to be possible. It is for 
the same reason that ‘inference to the best explanation’ arguments cannot be used to 
establish the existence of physical objects since their existence is a pre-condition for 
doing science. This type of argument tries to show that the ‘hypothesis’ of the physical 
world scores higher on explanatory virtues than does a sceptical alternative. But there 
is no virtue in accepting the existence of the physical world; it doesn’t pay to do so and 
we did not accept it for any reason at all.
No one was ever taught such things like ‘objects do not vanish when unperceived’ or 
that ‘I am a man and not a woman’. No one told me, and neither did I discover for 
myself, that I have never lived in China, “...experience is not the ground for our game 
of judging. Nor its outstanding success” (OC 131). Our certainty in these things does 
not continue because it pays to do so, accepting them is just what we do. There is
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therefore an important difference between scientific investigations and their 
foundations.
In a certain sense, the foundations are idle. This is not to say they do not have a role. 
Scaffolding is idle but not useless. The role of the foundations is obviously supportive, 
but how and in what sense? Are they fundamental truths shared by all humanity? This 
cannot be right, since some of these foundations are relative and fluctuate between 
contexts and individuals. On the other hand, there are some that ‘stand absolutely fast’ 
such that no person can reasonably doubt. It remains unclear whether the foundations 
of language and thought are themselves propositions. Wittgenstein of course uses the 
term ‘hinge proposition’ (not more than three times in OC). He also says that the 
expression ‘physical objects exist’ is nonsense, which implies that it is not a proper 
proposition at all. Strawson (1985) is non-committal and prefers to speak of ‘crypto­
propositions’. But how can the substratum of thought be nonsense? Wittgenstein also 
advises us to look at the practice of language in order to see the logic of language (OC 
501), but says that our relation to the foundations of our system of judgements is not a 
kind of seeing, but an acting (OC 24). And what does he mean when he says “The 
existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the starting-point 
of belief for me”? (OC 209) We cannot infer anything from the propositions which 
form the world-picture. Take Strawsons four favourite hinges: the existence of the 
earth; the uniformity of nature; the existence of human beings; and the reality of the. 
past. I cannot derive any empirical proposition from these four hinges and in this sense 
they are useless. But can we derive them from ordinary empirical judgements?
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Meredith Williams (1999) has suggested the idea that hinge propositions are derivable 
from ordinary propositions:
The certainty of propositions that hold fast does not derive from their belonging to a 
transcendental structure which conditions all concrete empirical judgements; rather their 
certainty derives from the concrete empirical judgements that we make, (p.74)
Supposing that ‘which holds fast’ is derivable from ordinary empirical judgements, 
then from every such judgement we could derive the existence of the physical world. 
Given that Wittgenstein does not think we ordinarily say things like ‘this is a chair’, 
‘this is a hand’, etc., but learn to fetch books and sit on chairs (OC 476), then what 
stands fast must be buried in these orders. Deriving hinge propositions would mean 
that from the order:
(1)‘Bring me that chair.’
we can derive the proposition:
(2) That chairs exists.
From which we can derive:
(3) Physical objects exist.
However the idea that we can ‘derive’ the certainty of hinge propositions from 
empirical judgements gives the impression that hinge propositions have a ‘ghostly’ 
existence, somewhat like the elementary propositions of the Tractatus. If there are 
such things as hinge or framework propositions that form the substratum of all 
inquiring and asserting (OC 162), and they are such as to never be brought into doubt,
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then they would seem to have an abstract existence. This is a point noted by Wolgast 
(1987) who finds a tension in OC between Wittgenstein’s later view of meaning which 
ties the meaning of a word or sentence to its use, and the existence of significant but 
idle propositions. She says:
How can a proposition be important when it never comes into the language and is not learned 
as part of that language? It is precisely its not coming into that language as a working 
proposition that shows its character as fundamental. That is part of the criterion for its being 
a “framework proposition”. But this reasoning is circular: Framework propositions are 
important partly because they are not used; and they are not used because that is part of their 
framework role. (p. 162)
Wolgast has touched on something here but I am not sure that she has correctly 
interpreted Wittgenstein. Pointing out that our system of judgements excludes 
doubting hinge propositions does not necessarily make them significant. If they never 
come into language then an alternative reading is that they are vacuous. Strawson 
(1985) seems to suggest this:
To attempt to confront the professional skeptical doubt with arguments in support of these 
beliefs, with rational justifications, is simply to show a total misunderstanding of the role 
they actually play in our belief-systems. The correct way with the professional skeptical doubt 
is not to attempt to rebut it with argument, but to point out that it is idle, unreal, a pretence; 
and then the rebutting arguments will appear as equally idle (Strawson 1985, p. 19).
The difficulty I have perhaps been skirting around is the question of whether hinge 
propositions are propositions at all. If they are, then they must be meaningful. But then
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it would make sense to say things like ‘I am certain that physical objects exist’, which 
Wittgenstein seems to suggest is nonsense.
Malcolm (1982) puts his finger on the difficulty of speaking about the role of hinge 
propositions:
It is too fundamental to be either ‘unjustified’ or ‘justified’. It underlies any mastery of words 
in which a procedure of justification could be framed. This fundamental thing is so 
fundamental that it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to describe it in words. One would like 
to characterise it in mental terms -  to call it knowledge, or belief, or conviction, or certainty, 
or acceptance, or confidence, or assumption. But none of these expressions fit. All of them 
have their appropriate application within language-games. Whereas Wittgenstein is trying to 
call attention to something that underlies all language-games. (pp. 17-18)
While Wolgast observes an unresolved tension in OC between Wittgenstein’s later 
view of meaning as use and the existence of abstract propositions, Stroll (1994), on the 
other hand, observes progress and a possible solution in the text. He thinks that 
towards the end of OC, Wittgenstein began to develop a non-propositional account of 
hinge propositions (p. 156), as well as a propositional one. The propositional account 
has three characteristics. (1) hinge propositions form a system, (2) some hinge 
propositions stand relatively fast, and (3) some hinge propositions stand absolutely 
fast. The non-propositional account he says, abandons (1) and (2) and is marked by the 
three features of instinct, acting, and training.
On this interpretation, what Wittgenstein takes to be foundational is a picture of the world we 
all inherit as members of a human community. We have been trained from birth in ways of
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acting that are non-reflective to accept a picture of the world that is ruthlessly realistic... This 
picture is manifested in action...The foundations are neither known nor unknown, neither 
reasonable nor unreasonable. They are there, just like our lives, (pp. 158-159)
If Malcolm and Stroll’s reading of OC is correct, and Stroll does cite textual evidence 
for his claim, then the picture which emerges is that knowledge rests on ineffable 
foundations which are absolutely necessary for our epistemic practices. Not only does 
it make no sense to doubt them or affirm them, it makes no sense to utter them at all.
The difficulty for the view that what stands fast is ineffable is that we cannot say that 
they stand fast, and Wittgenstein, like the sceptic, utters a meaningless expression by 
commenting on their special status.
Wittgenstein faces a dilemma here. If what stands fast is non-propositional, then it 
cannot make sense to say that we are certain of them or to express their special 
character at all because of their ineffability. If they are propositional, then it seems 
Wittgenstein is committed to the Tractarian view that there exist propositions which 
never come into our language, thereby conflicting with his later theory that the 
meaning of an expression is connected to its use.
We might think that the following passage offers a potential exit from the above 
dilemma:
Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You 
must look at the practice of language, then you will see it. (OC 501)
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This suggests that Wittgenstein never abandoned the saying/showing distinction of the 
Tractatus. There the distinction was used to make the point that the logic of language 
cannot itself be described but is manifest in its actual employment. However, as Glock 
(1996) notes, there is a second passage where Wittgenstein explicitly denies the 
saying/showing distinction:
Indeed, doesn’t it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by 
certain facts?
In that case it would seem as if the language-game must ‘show ’ the facts that make it 
possible. (But that’s not how it is.) (OC 617-618)
Glock (1996) offers an alternative reading, which suggests a way out of the dilemma. 
He says that Wittgenstein nowhere states that hinge propositions cannot be stated, only 
that they are not. As textual evidence he cites OC 88 where Wittgenstein says ‘if they 
are ever formulated’. Glock goes on to say:
What is correct is this. Wittgenstein tentatively suggested that to say, with Moore, that we 
know hinge propositions creates confusion because it invites sceptical doubts, and is hence at 
odds with our treating them as certain, which shows itself in the way we act. But this is not to 
say that it creates confusion or fuels scepticism to draw attention to these propositions, as 
long as one does not mistakes them for ordinary empirical claims. (Glock 1996, P. 139)
So, according to Glock, we can state hinge propositions as long as we do not say that 
we know them and one remembers their special logical role. I think this is probably 
correct. This interpretation also tallies with a remark Wittgenstein makes at OC 232, 
where he says it would be more correct to say that we could doubt every single fact
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and do not doubt them all, rather than that we cannot doubt them all. The force of the 
‘cannot’ derives from human practice and not from the intrinsic nature of hinge 
propositions. This suggests that the ineffability of certain hinge propositions is also not 
intrinsic and that it is not impossible to formulate them under particular circumstances.
The sceptic cannot doubt hinge propositions without collapsing large portions of how 
we understand and navigate our way around the world. Accepting them is just 
something we all do and it is not clear what making a mistake with regard to a hinge 
proposition is like. This shows that underneath judging, must lie certainty (OC 115). 
What would it mean to be in error about this being a hand? I could be deluded, 
dreaming, or drugged, but these make sense against the idea that one can wake up 
from a dream or ‘come down’ from a drug-induced experience. Thus doubt about 
these propositions makes sense in extraordinary cases, but there is nothing in such 
cases to support scepticism.
DOUBTING CERTAINTIES
How devastating is this response for the sceptic? Michael Williams raises the following 
objection. He says:
It will not do to object that Wittgenstein shows more than that we do not treat certain hinge 
propositions as open to question but that, since their standing fast for us constitutes what 
we understand by judgement, we cannot so treat them. At least, it will not do unless we have 
a way of meeting the reply that “cannot” only means “cannot if we are to get on with 
ordinary pursuits.” As historians, we cannot entertain radical doubts about the reality of the
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past. But this does not mean we cannot entertain them as epistemologists (Williams 1996, 
p. 158).
Michael Kober makes a similar criticism:
As this (the sceptic’s) use of the word “dreaming” does not accord completely with its 
ordinary use, it detaches the sceptic from his ordinary practices and their 
presuppositions...On the other hand...describing practices of a form of life, for hermeneutic 
reasons, from “within”- cannot dissolve a detached scepticism (p.438).
Recall Stroud’s earlier claim that, in the context of philosophy, our thoughts are not 
constrained by practical limitations or necessities. Our only concern is with the goal of 
truth. Williams and Kober make a similar objection. The sceptic can adopt a detached 
position ‘outside’ all of our practices and, in the isolated context of philosophy, is free 
to doubt all hinge propositions. Indeed, the objection that the survival of practices 
requires hinge propositions can be seen as a restatement of the sceptical paradox rather 
than a solution. Wittgenstein himself is aware of this when he writes:
The statement “I know that here is a hand” may then be continued: “for it’s my hand that I’m 
looking at”. Then the reasonable man will not doubt that I know. -  Nor will the idealist; 
rather he will say that he was not dealing with the practical doubt which is being dismissed, 
but there is a further doubt behind that one. -  That this is an illusion has to be shown in a 
different way. (OC 19)
Wittgenstein has an argument that bridges the gap between the practical indubitability 
of hinge propositions and their theoretical indubitability, although it is not to be found
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in OC. But Williams ignores this aspect of Wittgenstein’s response because he finds the 
intuitive intelligibility of scepticism so powerful that any theory of linguistic 
competence is likely to be less convincing than the sceptical intuition itself (p.xix).
Now, I do not know how one distinguishes between more and less powerful intuitions. 
One cannot appeal, for example, to differences in ‘liveliness’ or ‘vivacity’ and, while 
many philosophers would agree with Williams’ intuition, many ‘ordinary language’ 
philosophers have considered scepticism to be highly unintuitive. Stroud shares 
Williams’ intuition but, unlike Williams, he is taken with the incoherence strategy as 
the most suitable form of challenge to scepticism (p.274), even though he is unable to 
offer any positive account along these lines. Clearly the extra burden carried by an 
incoherence strategy is worth the labour if it truly is the most promising anti-sceptical 
response.
Williams himself is stalking the sceptic, only he has no time for demonstrating 
scepticism’s’ unintelligibility. He is happy to exile scepticism to the philosopher’s study 
and remove its general significance. While this is one anti-sceptical response, it is not 
the one Wittgenstein is proffering. If Williams’ objection stands, then so does the 
intelligibility of scepticism.
The discussion up until now has sought to provide an account of the role of hinge
propositions in our practices. Following Strawson and Stroll, I have focused on the
absolute hinge propositions, which, as we have seen, are not relative to particular
practices, but to thought in general. Moreover, if Stroll is correct, what supports all
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our linguistic or discursive practices is itself non-propositional and practical. The 
foundations of all thought and action are then ineffable.
But the sceptic has not been entirely silenced, since he will argue that the ineffability of 
these certain foundations persists only as long as we conceive of ourselves from within 
those foundations. The ineffability is practically necessary for our thinking about the 
world, but the possibility of a detached theoretical perspective from which to articulate 
and assess the truth of our ‘assumptions’ seems to persist. I am therefore returning to 
Stroud’s concept of ‘objectivity’ developed in section II, which until now I have left 
untouched and looming in the background.
The completion of Wittgenstein’s anti-sceptical response involves showing that the 
theoretical or objective perspective is illusory and that there is no privileged position 
from which to articulate the hinges of our world-picture. The idea that one can 
simultaneously plunge a practice into confusion and preserve the terms which serve to 
characterise that practice is something which cannot be done.
Consider again the case of determining length. Suppose the practice of determining 
length is thrown into confusion by refusing to accept any agreed standard of 
correctness for ascribing length. What exactly does it mean to question such a 
practice?
What "determining the length" means is not learned by learning what length and 
determining are, but the meaning of the word "length" is learnt among other things, by 
learning what it is to determine length. (PI II XT )
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For Wittgenstein, the meaning of ‘length’ and ‘determine’ is learnt by the methods we 
use for determining length, and so plunging the practice into confusion deprives the 
words from the contexts in which they derived their sense. When the sceptic questions 
our ability to determine length he obviously does not consider this doubt as infecting 
the meaning of the words 'length' and 'determine'.
If our ability to determine length is questioned, then a distinction is forged between 
word and application. This distinction assumes it makes sense to apply our words for 
determining length externally, from a position outside the contexts in which the word 
has application.
The sceptic about the external world works with the same distinction between meaning 
and application. He thinks it is possible to speak of an external world (the sceptic is not 
an idealist) about which we can know nothing.
If, therefore, I doubt or am uncertain about this being my hand (in whatever sense), why not 
in that case about the meaning of these words as well? (OC 4 5 6 )
If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting whether the word 
"hand" has any meaning? So that is something I seem to know after all. (OC 383)
"I know that this is a hand". - And what is a hand? - "Well, this, for example." (OC 268) 
The truth of my statements is the test of my understanding of these statements. That is to say: 
If I make certain false statements, it becomes uncertain whether I understand them (OC 80- 
81)
The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference. (OC 83)
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Wittgenstein is here expressing the thought that entertaining certain doubts -  doubts 
about whether ‘This is a hand’ for example -  entails a doubt about the meaning of the 
words used to express the doubt. This is not Wittgenstein deepening the sceptical 
problem to the semantic level so that we have to seek for a justification of the way we 
interpret our words. On the contrary, Wittgenstein is quite certain that we do know 
how to use our words even though there are no grounds for this use (OC 307). 
Clearly, it is a prerequisite for the intelligibility of scepticism that the sceptic correctly 
understands the meaning of his words.
Scepticism can be seen as holding the following two claims6:
(1) The sceptic understands the meaning of the words used to express his
doubt.
(2) It is possible to systematically make false judgements using those words.
Wittgenstein denies the consistency between (1) and (2). His argument is that if (2) is 
true, then (1) is false. The possibility of systematically making false judgements entails 
a failure to understand the words used to express those judgements. “This is a similar 
case to that of showing that it has no meaning to say that a game has always been 
played wrong” (OC 496). Suppose the game of chess was always played wrong so that 
every move made contravened its rules. We would no longer say that this person was 
playing chess, he may be playing some other game using the same wooden pieces, but 
he does not use those pieces according to the same set of rules.
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Wittgenstein’s argument against the compatibility of (1) and (2) is premised on the 
claim that meaning cannot be divorced from a practice. The relation between the 
meaning of a word and its use is conceived on the model of a rule and its application 
(OC 62) so that using a word or expression is understood as participating in a rule- 
governed activity, like that of playing chess.
Every language-game is based on words 'and objects' being recognised again. We learn with
the same inexorability that this is a chair as that 2+2 = 4 (455).
But what determines this inexorability and how is it possible? When we learn how to 
use a word, we do so only from a finite number of exemplifications, but the rules which 
determine their application extend way beyond these samples and into the future, and 
yet we still all go on using the word in the same way. This is something quite 
remarkable. How do we explain the fact that we are able to learn the meaning of a 
word from being taught to use it on a limited number of occasions, to recognising it 
again and again? Apart from this question of understanding a rule, there is the further 
problem of the normativity of rules. How is it that a rule can uniquely determine a 
course of action or judgement? What makes one application of a rule the correct one?
Wittgenstein uses the example of teaching a pupil an arithmetical series as a means for 
focusing the discussion.
6 See for instance, Strawson (1983) p. 10 and Hookway (1990) p. 127
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Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say + 2) beyond 1000 -  and he writes 1000, 1004, 
1008, 1012.We say to him: “Look what you’ve done!” -  He doesn’t understand. -  He 
answers: “Yes, isn’t it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it.” - Or suppose he 
pointed to the series and said: “But I went on in the same way.” -  It would now be no use to 
say: “But can’t you see...?” - and repeat the old examples and explanations. (PI 185)
Wittgenstein wants us to think about how we would interpret this example, which on 
the face of it seems clear enough. The pupil is being taught to continue a mathematical 
series by being given the rule ‘+2’ and some examples, which he has hitherto followed 
correctly. But then the pupil goes wrong, a mistake is made and he fails to see how he 
has deviated from the original rule. Wittgenstein says this case is similar to someone 
reacting to a gesture of pointing by looking from the fingertips to the wrist rather than 
in the direction from wrist to fingertip (PI 185).
But what does this show? A dog instinctively looks in the direction of finger tip to 
wrist, so the suggestion seems to be that the pupil behaves in a similarly unnatural way. 
Yet no problem immediately suggests itself. The example seems not to threaten our 
own understanding of the rule or to question the correctness of our application. The 
teacher is correct and the pupil, we think, is perhaps a bit slow.
To a philosophical mind the absence of a problem can sometimes itself be cause for 
concern. Although in this case we would say the pupil is clearly wrong, the subject of 
misapplying rules in general has been broached. What, we might go on to ask, allows 
us to say that our ‘natural’ interpretation of the rule is the correct one. This is further
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complicated by the phenomenology of understanding that suggests we understand a 
word or expression immediately, that it comes to us ‘in a flash’ as it were.
“It’s as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash.” -  And that is just what we say 
we do...It becomes queer when are led to think that the future development must in some way already 
be present in the act of grasping the use and yet isn’t present. -  For we say that there isn’t any doubt 
that we understand the word, and on the other hand its meaning lies in its use (PI 197).
Wittgenstein recognises an important piece of phenomenology here. Understanding the 
meaning of word seems to be an experience of some kind. We experience the meaning 
of a word in an instant, as if we were observing an object. But obviously the use of the 
word is extended in time and cannot be identical with that experience. Perhaps then, 
when we grasp the meaning of a word, we experience an instance of the more general 
rule. The situation of the pupil would then be like this. The rule ‘+2’ traverses an 
infinite number of steps, but when the teacher was instructing the pupil, he did not 
have such an infinite number of steps in mind. While we seem to grasp the meaning of 
a word in a flash, we cannot grasp an infinite series in a flash. There seems to be no 
mental act which has the capability of grasping every instance of the rule. So we shall 
be inclined to say that the rule itself predetermines the correct steps the teacher takes 
(PI 188)7.
Does this mean then, asks Wittgenstein, that a new insight or intuition is needed at 
every step (PI 186)? He rejects this suggestion on the grounds that the question of 
how to apply the insight itself emerges. How do we decide what is the correct step to
7 Fogelin, 1976. P. 141.
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take with each insight? It seems that without a more general rule of interpretation we 
shall be unable to determine whether the insight is correct. So we seem neither able to 
grasp a general rule nor able to guarantee that an insight corresponds to a general rule 
without introducing a further general rule to legitimise it.
Wittgenstein considers further ways of bridging the gap between rule and application, 
all of which postulate some object, process, or interpretation, as means for grounding 
the initial application. He rejects them all for the same reason he rejected the initial 
suggestion of an insight.
For example, he rejects the suggestion that what connects rule and application is some 
mental state which we represent to ourselves as a means for interpreting the rule. The 
problem with this type of response is that it also leads to a regress. For it appears that 
we have simply substituted one representation for another, albeit a mental for a 
physical one. If the representation is an image or picture, then the picture can be 
interpreted in more than one way8, while if one uses words, then we have substituted 
one sign for another sign without progress.
Wittgenstein rejects the idea that there is anything which determines the inexorability 
of applying rules like + 2 other than the practice of actually doing so. Nothing more is 
needed to close the gap between rule and application and it is illusory to look for one.
The essence of Wittgenstein’s answer to these problems is given at PI 1989
8 Blackburn 1984. Chpt.2
9 Williams 1999, p. 167
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Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule -  say a sign-post -  got to do with my 
actions? What sort of connexion is there here? -  Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained 
to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. But that is only to give a 
causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what 
this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have further indicated that a 
person goes by a sign-post only insofar as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom 
(PI 198)
To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, 
institutions). (PI 199).
Fogelin (1976, pl43), correctly identifies two elements in Wittgenstein’s account of 
rule-following from these remarks: one is reference to a causal element between sign 
and action and the other is a social element in the form of a custom or practice. 
Wittgenstein is not saying that the rule together with training and the practice uniquely 
determines the future application of a rule. The training is already embedded in a 
practice and this is why he dismisses the objection that he has only given a causal 
connection, as if we could ask the question of whether this training was itself correct. 
The fact that we react to the sign-post as a sign and not as a mere piece of wood 
shows that to follow a rule is for the rule to already be embedded in a practice. The 
rule is our standard of correctness, but what makes it the standard for correctness is 
not anything inherent in the rule itself, but our using it as such. As Williams puts it:
It is the very conformity of action and judgement that allows for the possibility of deviation 
and so incorrect behaviour. It is only in conformity and failure to conform that a significant 
contrast between correct and incorrect action emerges. And these bedrock practices are 
rooted in “the common behaviour of mankind” (PI 206) (Williams 1999, p. 175)
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With the introduction of a ‘practice’, the need to search for explanations or 
justifications determining the correct use of a rule comes to an end. Obeying a rule is a 
capacity, an ability to behave in a way which conforms with the behaviour of those 
who are part of the practice. One is trained to react to the sign-post and being able to 
react appropriately is the criterion of having mastered the rule.
For our purposes, the important aspect of the idea of a practice is that the standards 
for the correct and incorrect application of a rule or use of a term belong to a practice. 
It makes no sense to claim that we understand the meaning of a sign like ‘+ 2’ and 
question whether we correctly use it in the way we do, since our using it in the way we 
do is the criterion for correct and incorrect application. Doubting the correctness of 
our actual application therefore implies doubting the meaning of the rule.
I claimed earlier that the sceptic holds two potentially incompatible propositions. He 
assumes that it is possible for us to make systematically false judgements while 
simultaneously understanding the meaning of the words used to express that doubt. 
Wittgenstein, I suggest, has an explanation of why this assumption is false.
The explanation has turned on the analogy that understanding a word or expression is 
similar to following a rule. The correct use of a word is an instance of correctly 
applying a rule. From the forgoing discussion, we have seen that what determines 
whether a course of action constitutes the correct application of a particular rule is not 
some interpretation of the rule since one interpretation only leads to another, and so 
on:
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What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but 
which is exhibited in what we call “ obeying the rule” and “ going against it” in actual cases 
(PI 201).
Obeying a rule is not an intellectual feat, but the manifestation of ability acquired 
through training against the background of a practice.
To argue that we systematically make false judgements is to imply that, as a 
community, we have been teaching and responding to the wrong set of rules. 
However, it should be clear by now why this question cannot be raised. For it supposes 
that there is some way of fixing the meaning of a word outside actual cases of applying 
it. But this is to court the regress of interpretations.
The sceptic about the external world implicitly works with a different conception of 
rule and application. By virtue of adopting a detached perspective our system of 
empirical judgements, the sceptic assumes it makes sense to speak of using words in a 
way incongruent with the rest of mankind, as though our words have a meaning 
distinct from the way we actually use them.
Scepticism is unintelligible because it tries to adopt an external interpretation of our 
practice of describing the external world, when no such interpretation could fix the 
meaning of a word. I have assumed rather than argued that Wittgenstein’s notion of a 
practice is social and excludes private practices. To argue for this would take me too 
far adrift into the so-called private language argument.
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One might still feel that scepticism is intelligible. What is unintelligible is the roar of a 
lion or hearing a language one does not understand. Furthermore, if Wittgenstein says 
a practice is required in order to fix the meaning of concepts, then he need look no 
further than philosophy itself. Scepticism has been with us for centuries and it is often 
students first taste of philosophy. There are correct and incorrect ways of presenting 
and arguing for the sceptical argument itself.
These points are all valid, but I think we can allow for intelligibility of scepticism in an 
innocuous sense. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein asks whether it is nonsensical to 
say that a pot talks or to ascribe pain to a doll (PI 282). He answers that it is not, but 
qualifies this by adding that this way of speaking is ‘secondary’ and parasitic on 
ascribing language and pain to human beings. I think the same point can be made 
against scepticism, or if one prefers, the ‘practice’ of scepticism. The sceptic believes 
himself to have discovered some kind of defect or limitation in the concepts we use for 
describing the world, when in fact, he has merely given himself a new interpretation of 
the concepts which everyone else uses. This new interpretation is neither an 
immaterialistic one, as in Berkeley’s sense (since the sceptic is a realist) nor a common 
sense one.. There is room for the intelligibility of scepticism. Unfortunately for the 
sceptic, what scepticism means is not what he would like it to mean while what he 
would like it to mean remains a mystery.
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CONCLUSION
I have been attempting to make a case for the unintelligibility of scepticism. The 
notion of unintelligibility has centred around whether or not it is possible to doubt 
certain propositions. According to a naturalised epistemology, all propositions have 
the status of a hypothesis, but differ in the degree to how well they explain particular 
phenomenon. On this understanding, scepticism is fantastically ad hoc, complex and 
highly implausible, but nevertheless intelligible. The other side of this, of course, is 
that our ordinary judgements are considered extremely good at explaining the 
phenomena of human experience and therefore, are highly plausible.
While one may invoke ordinary judgements as explanatory, this is not their natural 
role. For as Moore observed, it strains the sense of judgements like ‘This is a hand* or 
‘I am wearing clothes’, to express any degree of doubt about them. Moore himself 
was consistent in his conviction that these ordinary judgements, as well as certain 
‘metaphysical’ propositions like, ‘human beings exist’, are absolutely certain for him 
and for everyone else. However, he tended to waver over whether or not scepticism is 
unintelligible or just implausible. Essentially, what he lacked was an argument which 
would show how the universal certainty attaching to ordinary propositions prevents 
the sceptic from raising his doubts in the first place. Admittedly, he did come close to 
such an argument in DCS. He tried to argue that a denial of knowledge of the external 
world commits one to knowledge of its existence. While his strategy was on the right 
track, his argument was a disaster. One gets the feeling that Moore contributed to, 
rather than put an end to the sceptic’s doubts.
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This, I think, is what Wittgenstein observed with clarity, when he criticised Moore’s 
use of “I know” in relation to the propositions he enumerated in DCS. Claiming to 
know p, invites the obligation to say how one knows it. This Moore could not do. But 
this does not mean that Moore’s claims are unjustified and scepticism therefore 
triumphs. What is essentially important in entering a knowledge claim is not the claim 
itself, but the grounds for it. Moore was wrong to say he knew hinge propositions not 
because he could not justify them but because there are no grounds for them. With 
hinge propositions bedrock is reached. The absence of grounds is not a lack. We are 
not epistemically ‘cut off or denied evidence for them. Rather there is no evidence 
and this is because of their special role in the system of our empirical judgements.
Wittgenstein is a foundationalist. With his hinge proposition we reach ‘ the bedrock of 
our convictions’ (OC 116). However, he is not a traditional foundationalist (Stroll 
1996. Chpt 9) since the propositions which support the body of our beliefs have a 
different status from the body itself. The crucial difference is that hinge propositions 
are non-epistemic. By this is meant that they are exempt from doubt (OC 341). To 
say that I can doubt that I have never been to the moon, is madness (OC 663). But, in 
contrast with the view of other foundationalists such as Descartes ( Malcolm, 1986), 
the indubitability of these propositions does not entail truth. Rather hinge propositions 
decide what is true or false and what it is possible to doubt.
This ‘not doubting’ is not an act of will ( Malcolm 1986). There is no individual or 
collective act of denial, as though we had decided as a community to insulate hinge 
propositions from doubt. The situation is, as we have seen, that we do not doubt them
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and this is shown in our lives ( OC 344). Our behaviour shows the absence of doubt. 
The foundations of knowledge are not therefore agreed upon, but there is agreement 
in action if not in opinion.
From the discussion of rule-following the notion of a practice was introduced. A 
practice determines what stands fast and what does not. Hinge propositions are like 
sign-posts which we are trained causally to react to, but the training takes place 
against the background of a practice. Agreement in action is primarily the result of 
interaction with such a practice as well as through a causal relationship with certain 
facts of nature1 Wittgenstein is reluctant to say that hinge propositions are indubitable 
in principle. As practices change over time, so some propositions lose then- 
indubitable status becoming part of the empirical waters instead.
The sceptic is in no position to doubt hinge propositions either. Doubting that which 
makes doubting and the adducing of evidence possible is itself not a possibility. 
Despite the temporal indubitability of that which stands fast, it would be a mistake to 
think that the sceptic, by imagining certain unheard -of events is thereby able to 
induce doubt about them. If, for example, houses turned into steam or cattle stood on 
their heads (OC 514), this would not contradict what stands fast. While the rules 
which determine the use of names for objects in a practice reaches into the future, for 
some possibilities there are no rules. If unheard-of events did occur, this would not 
falsify what we know, but would lead to a conceptual change, somewhat similar to the
1 Fogelin (1976, p. 144) emphasises the general dependence of practices on the natural constitution of 
human beings. He says, for example, that if our spatial abilities had evolved differently, then we would 
have correspondingly evolved a different geometry.
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conceptual changes which occur in scientific theories. This is why scepticism, as well 
as denying us anything to reflect on, denies us anything to reflect with.
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